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Catholic Philosophy

AND THE

ROYAL UNIVERSITY PROGRAMME.



CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY

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BY THE

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INTRODUCTION.

THE following is an attempt to discuss a somewhat difficult and complicated question. The attempt is made, not so much in the hope of working out a satisfactory solution, as in that of attracting to the subject and its surroundings, the attention of those more competent to deal with it successfully. The formidable influence—for good or for evil, according as it is rightly or wrongly directed—which a university course of Philosophy would be likely to exercise upon the “*perfervidum ingenium Scotorum*,” stirred as it has been of recent years into such extraordinary ardour, will be assumed throughout. Considering the scope of the paper, it would be idle to enlarge upon such a theme.

Two other assumptions yet more fundamental must be made. These assumptions are, however, so obviously just that one feels it almost necessary to apologise for enunciating them at all. They are :—(1) That the Catholic people of Ireland having a strict and indefeasible right—a right which has never been and never will be surrendered or compromised—to a Catholic University, have *a fortiori*, pending the concession of that long-delayed boon, a strict and indefeasible right to a course of Philosophy, in at least *one* of the two existing universities of their country, which shall be in *perfect*

conformity with the Catholic system of philosophical teaching ;
 (2) That the bishops of Ireland are the sole authoritative judges in this country as to whether a proposed course is in such conformity with that system or not. -

THE QUESTION STATED.

The question to which this paper seeks to supply an answer is this :—What form of programme in the department of Philosophy at the Royal University would be, all circumstances considered, the best calculated to protect and promote the grave Catholic interests here at stake. One of these interests is undoubtedly the interest of fair play, and, connected therewith, the interest of the fair fame of our Catholic candidates for talent and merit. We Catholics are naturally very anxious that candidates of our religion should get a “fair field” for the display of their intellectual prowess, but we should be very sorry indeed that they should get any “favour,” or that it should be in any one’s power to question the value of the tests by which that prowess has been established. The interest of fair play is, however, the least of those here contemplated. As will naturally be anticipated, those mainly kept in view throughout are of the intellectual, religious, and moral order.

THE CATHOLIC SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHICAL TEACHING.

Before attempting to solve the proposed question, it will be necessary to determine the principles which should govern its solution. These principles have, fortunately, been very clearly laid down for us by the highest authority. They are embodied in the now famous passage of the Encyclical, *Æterni Patris*, which promulgates what His Holiness designates as a “disciplina Philosophica ;” what a distinguished commentator* has called *La Regola Filosofica* ; or, what we may term in English, “The Catholic System of Philosophical Teaching.” The promulgation of this system delivers us, once and for ever, from the danger of being perplexed or misled by conflicting opinions or views as to the best method of conducting the study of Christian Philosophy. It is, undoubtedly, one of the greatest benefits for which we are indebted to the keen, cultured, and far-reaching intellect

* Father Cornoldi, S.J.

which now guides the destinies of the Church, and it is with peculiar pleasure we recall the fact, that the bishops of Ireland were amongst the first to tender a congratulatory address to His Holiness, thanking him for the immense services thus rendered to the cause of Christian Philosophy, and promising their loyal and dutiful co-operation in carrying the instructions of the Encyclical into effect. The following is the passage referred to:—

“Whilst therefore We declare, that everything that has been wisely said, as well as everything that has been profitably discovered or thought out by anyone whomsoever, should be received with a willing and grateful mind; We exhort you all, Venerable Brethren, with the greatest earnestness, to reinstate and to propagate, far and wide, the golden wisdom of St. Thomas—unto the safety and glory of the Catholic faith, the advantage of society, and the progress of all the sciences. We say the wisdom of St. Thomas; for if anything has been inquired into by the Scholastic doctors with too great subtlety, or taught by them with too little consideration, if anything is out of harmony with well-established doctrines of a later age, or, in fine, if anything is in any way improbable, it is by no means our intention to propose that to this age for imitation. Further, let professors, carefully chosen by you, labour earnestly to instil into the minds of their scholars the teaching of St. Thomas, and let them make it quite clear that no other is so solid and so excellent. Let Academies, founded by you, or to be founded in the future, illustrate and defend it, and use it for the refutation of the errors of the times. But lest the false should be drunk in instead of the true, or that which is unwholesome instead of that which is pure, take heed that the wisdom of Thomas be drawn from the fountain head, or at least from those streams which, in the certain and unanimous opinion of learned men, carry it pure and undefiled therefrom. Take care, moreover, that the minds of the young be kept from streams which are said indeed to flow from the source, but which in reality have been swollen by foreign and unwholesome waters.”*

* Nos igitur, dum edicimus libenti gratoque animo excipiendum esse quidquid sapienter dictum, quidquid utiliter fuerit a quopiam inventum atque excogitatum; Vos omnes, Venerabiles Fratres, quam enixe hortamur, ut ad catholicæ fidei tutelam et decus, ad societatis bonum, ad scientiarum omnium incrementum, auream sancti Thomæ sapientiam restituatis, et quam latissime propagatis. Sapientiam sancti Thomæ dicimus: si quid enim est a doctoribus Scholasticis

The method delineated by the Sovereign Pontiff in the foregoing passage, is *the sole approved method* of Catholic Philosophical Teaching, whether for lay or for ecclesiastical students.* It shall be as a "lamp to our feet" in the discussion which follows. Any plan of a programme, whatever be the advantages claimed for it otherwise, which is calculated to defeat, or which is not calculated to secure, the objects which this method seeks to attain, must be held to be so far perilously uncatholic;† while, on the other hand, any plan, whatever be its shortcomings otherwise, which is well adapted to secure those objects, should commend itself to our approval and acceptance.

Now the objects, bearing on the question in hand, which this system aims at securing are reducible to the three following:—

I. That Catholic students shall have *a thorough, minute,*

vel nimia subtilitate quæsitum vel parum considerate traditum, si quid cum, exploratis posterioris ævi doctrinis minus cohærens, vel denique quoquo modo non probabile, id nullo pacto in animo est ætati nostræ ad imitandum proponi. Ceterum, doctrinam Thomæ Aquinatis studeant magistri, a Vobis intelligenter lecti, in discipulorum animos insinuare: eiusque præ ceteris soliditatem atque excellentiam in perspicuo ponant. Eamdem Academiæ a Vobis institutæ aut instituendæ illustrent ac tueantur, et ad grassantium errorum refutationem adhibeant. Ne autem supposita pro vera, neu corrupta pro sincera bibatur, provideat ut sapientia Thomæ ex ipsis eius fontibus hauriatur, aut saltem ex iis rivis, quos ab ipso fonte deductos, adhuc integros et illimes decurrere certa et concors doctorum hominum sententia est: sed ab iis, qui exinde fluxisse dicuntur, re autem alienis et non salubribus aquis creverunt, adolescentium animos arcendos curate.

* *Cuncti* adolescentes, sed ii nominatim qui in Ecclesiæ spem succrescant, pollenti ac robusto doctrinæ [Aquinatis] pabulo . . . nutriendi sunt.

† It is true that His Holiness does not propound this system as one of *strict obligation*. But the distinction between a formal precept of the Holy Father and an exhortation or injunction so solemn as that contained in this Encyclical, is a distinction practically of little moment especially where the Bishops of Ireland are concerned. "It must be borne in mind that it is the uniform practice of the Sovereign Pontiffs to prefer to use *persuasion* rather than *commands* in their efforts to bring about the removal of certain abuses eo vel maxime scientes quod Rmi. locorum Ordinarii eorumque Cleri verba *exhortationis* Summi Pontificis *loco mandati* pie et religiose interpretari solent" (Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites. See *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, July, 1883, p. 467). Now no exhortation could be stronger than that conveyed in such expressions as the following, which are found in this Encyclical:—"Magno studio volumus," "nihil est Nobis antiquius et optabilius," "quam enixe exhortamur." Nay, there is at least one passage which seems to hint that something very like an obligation to conform to this method existed *even antecedently* to the publication of the Encyclical. "Judicamus temere esse commissum ut eidem (disciplinæ philosophicæ) suus honos non semper nec ubique permanserit." Upon this passage Father Cornoldi makes the following comment:—"Si conceda che prima dell' Enciclica vi sia stata una tal quale libertà d'insegnamento rispetto alla filosofia dell' Aquinate; ma insieme si dovrà ammettere che ora il Papa non lascia la medesima libertà che prima vi era: altrimenti sarebbe inesplicabile ciò che egli ordinò e ciò che fece" (*La Riforma della Filosofia*, p. 124).

and detailed knowledge of approved text-books of philosophy, based upon the doctrine of St. Thomas.*

II. That Catholic students shall be free from any necessity or temptation of making a study of objectionable non-Catholic text-books of philosophy.†

III. That, so far as this object is compatible with the two preceding, Catholic students shall have a competent knowledge of *the leading and important questions* special to non-Catholic philosophy, and be able to discuss and solve them.‡

All these objects are of great importance, but the first is the main stress—it is the object *par excellence*—of the Ency-

* Nihil nobis est antiquius et optabilius quam ut sapientiæ rivos purissimos ex angelico Doctore jugi et prædiviti venâ dimanantes, studiosæ juventuti *large copioseque* universi præbeatis. And elsewhere: "Curavimus ut in Seminario Romano, in Lyceo Gregoriano, in Urbaniano aliisque Collegiis, Nostræ adhuc auctoritati obnoxiiis, *Philosophicæ disciplinæ secundum mentem et secundum principia Doctoris Angelici, enucleate, dilucide, copiose, tradantur atque excolantur.*"

† "Ab . . . alienis et non salubribus aquis . . . adolescentium animos arcendos curate."

‡ We cannot, perhaps, claim for this principle the formal approbation of the Encyclical. The following passages have some bearing on it:—"Edicimus libenti gratoque animo excipiendum esse quicquid sapienter dictum, quicquid utiliter fuerit a *quopiam* inventum atque excogitatum." And again: "Doctrinam Thomæ Aquinatis. . . . ad grassantium errorum *refutationem adhibeant Academiæ.*" It is needless to point out that students are to acquire this knowledge, not from non-Catholic text-books, but from the lectures of their professors. With respect to the refutation of errors, two things are to be observed; (1) that the errors which we are directed to refute are not obsolete errors of the past, but the errors that are gaining ground and working mischief around us (*errores grassantes*); (2) that the duty of refuting these errors, at least *ex professo*, is not assigned as the work of the *class-room*, but rather as the work of *Academies* or Philosophical Societies, which His Holiness desires to see established. This distinction is drawn most clearly in the passage quoted from the Encyclical; it is perfectly understood, and consistently carried out, in Rome. I have before me as I write the Lectures on Logic delivered in the College of Propaganda, during the year 1883-1884 by Professor Lorenzelli, who was specially appointed by His Holiness to the Chair of Philosophy in that college for the purpose of carrying out the policy of the Encyclical. How far is this treatise devoted to the refutation of modern errors in Logic? I am not prepared to say that even a single section is directed to that purpose. At all events, it contains less polemics than any treatise of the kind I have ever seen. Its object manifestly is to deliver the doctrine of St. Thomas *enucleate, dilucide, copiose*; those were the terms of the Professor's appointment. An exactly similar mode of procedure is adopted in Theology by Professor Satolli, of the same college. To make, then, the refutation of errors *the* primary object, or *a* primary object, of class teaching, at least during the first year of a student's course, would be entirely to frustrate the policy of the Encyclical, as well as to defeat one's own object. Polemics, therefore, in the class-room, in accordance with the best traditions of the schools, should be kept within strictly sober limits. I have, therefore, suggested in the text that none but *leading and important* questions should be made the subject of it. In the case of students whose course extends over two or three years, those limits might be proportionately widened.

clical.* This is only what common sense might have led us to expect. The first essential for the student of Philosophy is to “possess” himself thoroughly of the right Philosophy: then, and then only, is he in a position successfully to resist and triumphantly to refute the wrong. And it is not, after all, the refutation of error, but the attainment of truth, which constitutes the primary object of Philosophy, rightly understood.

The second object is barely less necessary than the first. The Law of the Index, and the censure of the *Sedis Apostolicæ*—not to refer again to the Encyclical before us—show what dangers the Holy See apprehends, especially to the minds of the young, from the study of pernicious books.

In a mixed community like ours, the third object, though subordinate to the other two, becomes a matter of urgent importance. Though the only sure protection of the student against the ever-varying forms of error lies in the clear, full, and firm possession of the true Philosophy; yet, in these countries a kind of Philosophy has latterly come to be so fashionable, and “burning questions” of the hour, oftentimes closely connected with the dogmas of faith, crop up for discussion with such frequency as to make it a matter of the greatest moment that at least those who have had the advantage of a university course should be competent to offer a solution of them in keeping with Catholic principles, and should be able to substantiate that solution by solid and cogent arguments.

PROPOSED PROGRAMMES.

It is now time to discuss in the light of the principles above laid down the merits of the rival programmes. These may be conveniently and exhaustively classified as follows:—

I. A common programme (for Catholics and non-Catholics), a common paper, and common prizes.

II. A programme in part common and in part special, a paper in part common and in part special, and common prizes.

III. Separate programmes, separate papers, and common prizes.

IV. Separate programmes, separate papers, and separate prizes.

* A thoughtful critic has remarked that “its effects will be to make priests and educated laymen study the enemy less and trust to their own arms more.”—*Dublin Review*, January, 1880, p. 209.

FIRST PLAN.

A common programme, a common paper, and common prizes.

It is a form of this first plan which is in actual use. There is, it would seem, but one opinion as to whether the first examination held under the existing programme has failed, and failed completely, to satisfy the just expectations of Catholics.* It is, fortunately, not necessary to attempt any inference from this failure.

The existing programme is constructed upon the principle of recognising equally Catholic and non-Catholic Philosophy. Now it seems to admit of demonstration that neither the existing programme, nor any other common programme framed upon the same principle, is compatible with the objects above specified as necessary to the realisation of the Catholic system of teaching Philosophy. It will be well, then, to consider carefully this first plan (1) as it may be expected to work under the existing programme; (2) as it might be expected to work under a reformed programme based on the same principle; and (3) as it might be expected to work under a common programme drawn up on a totally different principle. There will be thus three forms of this first plan to be discussed.

(First Form. The existing Programme.)

EXAMINATION FOR THE DEGREE OF B.A.

Honours. †

LOGIC, METAPHYSICS, ETHICS, AND HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

A minute and extensive knowledge of the following subjects:—

Formal Logic.—I. Concepts and terms; their Logical import, their various kinds.

II. Judgments and Propositions; their import and classification. Definition; Division.

III. Reasoning; Inferences, their analysis and classification. Immediate Inferences (Conversion, Opposition, &c.) Syllogisms, Categorical and Hypothetical;

* I have had personal opportunities of ascertaining the opinion of the greater number of Catholic Professors of Philosophy in Ireland on this subject, and I am consequently in a position to certify that it was unanimous and emphatic to the effect stated.

† There is no *Pass Course* in this set of subjects; it would be a *great advantage* if there were. There are, however, the two following *Pass Courses*:—(1) Latin, Greek, Logic, and either Metaphysics, Ethics, or Political Economy; (2) Mathematics, Mathematical Physics, Logic, and either Metaphysics, Ethics, or Political Economy.

their Rules, General and Special. Other forms of reasoning founded on the Syllogism (Sorites, &c.)

IV. The principles of Demonstrative and Probable Reasoning. A general outline of Induction and Analogy, and of the relations between these and Deduction.

V. Classification and Analysis of Fallacies incident to Formal Reasoning.

VI. System of the New Analytic Logic of Probability and Analogy.

Material or Applied Logic.—I. Truth, formal and real. Knowledge; Certainty, Probability, &c. Evidence, its kinds.

II. The Criteria of Truth; their nature and grounds.

III. Functions, and logical value of the Syllogism.

IV. A general outline of Induction and its Canons. Observation and Experiment; Scientific Explanation; Application of the Deductive and Hypothetical methods to the Discovery and Proof of the Laws of Nature.

V. Nature, and chief canons of Historical Evidence; its logical value.

VI. Logical Grounds and Methods of Experimental Inquiry, with examples.

METAPHYSICS.

The following subjects, together with special reference to the discussions concerning Causation and Necessary Beliefs.

Psychology.—Enumeration and Analysis of Psychical Phenomena, as Consciousness, Sensation, Imagination, Remembrance, Judgment, Reasoning, Appetite, Emotion, Volition.

II. Subject, Object, and their relation in cognition. Perception; Conception. Laws of mental development, and association of mental phenomena. The Nature and Properties of the Human Mind; mutual relations of the Mind and Body; Simplicity of the Human Mind; its Immortality.

III. Emotions and Passions. Appetite; the Will; their chief characteristics and relation to other faculties and mental phenomena.

General Metaphysics.—I. Object, methods, and chief divisions of Metaphysics.

II. Notion of Being. Conceptions of Existence, Essence, Substance,* Quality, Accident, Nature, Subsistence, Personality, Unity, Number, Identity, Diversity, Simplicity, Extension, Quantity, Space, Duration, Finite, Infinite; Relation; Possibility; Cause and Effect.

III. The principal Modes of Being, and their Relations; Mind, Matter, and their different Modes and Qualities.

IV. The leading principles of the chief Metaphysical systems, from Descartes to the present day.

ETHICS.

I. Various sources, occasions, and causes of human action, and their mutual relations; Pleasure, Pain, Happiness, Desire, Aversion, the Affections, &c.

II. Theories of the nature and origin of Moral Judgment and the Moral Faculty.

III. Moral Obligation; its Grounds. Theories concerning the nature, source, and criteria of Morality.

IV. Conscience; its nature and functions.

V. Exposition and classification of duties and virtues.

The Student will also be expected to show an acquaintance with the leading Ethical Systems of ancient and modern times.

It is to be presumed that the above programme is the best that could have been obtained at the time. Indeed, for all that is known to the contrary, it may be as good as any pro-

* In the *recent* programmes, by a manifest misprint, a full stop occurs after this word.

gramme *of the kind* that could be obtained even now. It was never accepted by Catholics, nor even tolerated by them further than to be allowed a trial. All competent Catholic authorities, who have been able to give any attention to the subject, are at present agreed in condemning it. There is warrant enough for this condemnation even on the face of the document.

The mere *indiscriminate use* of the terms "Soul" and "Mind," though in itself sufficiently reprehensible, would not, perhaps, have been a matter for very serious complaint in a programme like this, but anyone in any degree familiar with the phraseology of modern non-Catholic schools, will find, it is to be feared, a deep and ominous significance in the *determined and total* exclusion from it of the term "Soul," especially as this exclusion had to be accomplished, in at least some cases (as, for instance, in the phrase, "The Immortality of the Human *Mind*"*), at the expense of great, and, perhaps, so far as English usage is concerned, unexampled violence to language. One might have expected that any University in any Christian land would have taken care to give that word an honoured position on its programme, or, at least would not have shrunk from introducing it when the usage of speech, no less than considerations of variety, required its introduction.

But a charge of much greater gravity, some of the evidence in support of which lies also on the surface, has now to be made. It is this: the programme professes to set forth *inter alia* a course of Metaphysics and Ethics, but in the process of being set forth both sciences are, as Sir William Hamilton would have said, "eviscerated of all that which desiderates explanation."

Philosophy used to mean something more than a playing with "appearances;" something more even than a superficial knowledge of "realities;" it used to mean a searching after first causes, an inquiring into ultimate ends, a probing of inmost essences, an exploring of all the great deeps of human speculation, and a resolving of all the great problems of most

* A method has been found of evading the extreme harshness and awkwardness of this phrase. See Programme. This method, however, was not open to the Examiners; they had to exhibit it in its undisguised deformity. Many of us saw it for the first time in the following question set at the M.A. Examination in 1883:—"By what arguments would you prove the Immortality of the Human Mind." The English language has hitherto been Christian in its phraseology. Latterly an attempt is being made to dechristianise it. Is not the University thus lending some countenance to the attempt? But for a fuller notice of this subject, see below, pp. 19 & 20.

vital human interest. Philosophy, as thus conceived, was the "Science of Sciences," and, as such, was the first favourite of the greatest master-minds the world has ever seen—of a Plato, an Aristotle, a St. Augustine, a St. Thomas.

But a conception of philosophy, totally opposed to the foregoing, prevails at present in but too many non-Catholic Schools. These schools, holding it as a fundamental tenet that almost everything which we would consider worth knowing is unknowable, and that almost everything which we would consider worth solving is insoluble, and yet not being willing to give up all claim to the possession of a philosophy, have been forced to grace with that time-honoured and ennobling title a body of speculations so shallow and unprofitable that a recent non-Catholic writer has—not without some show of reason—compared the science, as thus conceived, to a "chasing of shadows."

Now it was but to be expected that the advocates of these views should struggle to obtain some recognition for them in a programme which was to be common to them with all others. On the other hand, it is clear that so far as this unreal philosophy obtained a footing, so far was genuine philosophy compelled to give ground—the two standing to each other in the relation of contradictories. Now how far has the unreal prevailed against the real? In my opinion, it has driven it almost completely out of the field!

Obtrusive evidence in support of the opinion just expressed, is furnished in the total suppression of so many of the vital questions, and in the great prominence given to speculations of incomparably inferior interest, as (in the Programme of *Metaphysics*), to speculations about Notions, Conceptions, Emotions, Associations, Beliefs, Phenomena, Laws, &c.; and (in the Programme of *Ethics*) to questions about Pleasure,* Pain, the Affections, &c.

But there is other evidence to the same effect not so obtrusive, but not less decisive, and this must be considered in some detail.

To begin with; (1) **Ontology** has been almost totally exterminated.† Upon this science, as the "Science of Real

* As illustrating the meaning of this term an imposing problem, to be found in the paper set in this subject in 1883, deserves to be recorded. It is this: "Account for the child's pleasure in *ex gr.* spinning a cockchafer." This was a question in *Ethics*, and for the Degree of B.A. with *Honours*.

† It seems still to have a feeble foothold in section iii.; but see below, question I, p. 12.

Being," Phenomenists and others might have been expected to make war to the death. And they have done so with no little success. The shadow of the science still remains, but the substance of it is gone. The process of evacuating it of all substance was of the simplest kind. The traditional terms were, indeed, in some instances subjected to slight though not insignificant alterations; but, in the great majority of cases, those terms were retained, care, however, being taken to preface them with an innocent-looking phrase, which emptied them of all Ontological content whatsoever. The following table will bring out this point more clearly. The first two terms are taken from the programme of Material Logic. They are introduced here as having a place also in Ontology, and as having a bearing upon the point under consideration.

Ontology.

CATHOLIC PROGRAMME.	UNIVERSITY PROGRAMME.
Truth.	Truth, * <i>Formal</i> and Real.
Necessary Truths.	Necessary <i>Beliefs</i> .
Being.	<i>Notion</i> of Being.
Existence.	<i>Conception</i> of Existence.
Essence.	<i>Conception</i> of Essence.
Substance.	<i>Conception</i> of Substance.

And so the list continues, no fewer than *twenty-three* terms† being introduced by the phrase "conception of," expressed or understood. In this way the science of Real Being is reduced to the science of Ideal Being; in other words, Ontology is effaced and a kind of Ideology is substituted in its stead. Thus are things made easy for philosophers who are unable to solve the so-called "problem of the bridge."

As there is danger that this criticism might appear, at least to those unfamiliar with the current phraseology of non-Catholic schools, to be somewhat overstrained, it will be well to show that the interpretation here given coincides exactly with that practically adopted by the University Examiners. The following is a complete list of *all* the questions hitherto set in Ontology. The number of questions is so small, compared with those set in Psychology, as to suggest a suspicion

* "The harmony of thought [not with the *object* but] with the *form* of thought."—SIR W. HAMILTON, *Logic*, I., p. 64.

† See note, p. 8.

that the science is, even in its transformed state, in some disfavour.

* 1. State Locke's doctrine of our *ideas* of Substance, Infinity, and Qualities of Bodies.

* 2. Do we derive the *idea* of Space from Sight?

† 3. State your *notion* of Personality. Distinguish between the *concepts* Human Personality and Human Nature.

† 4. State briefly Kant's view as to the origin of our *notion* of Space. Criticise this theory.

† 5. Explain and illustrate: "By the doctrine of Causation I mean the *notion* or first principle that all things come of effective will."

† 6. How do we acquire our *knowledge* of Form and Size?

§ 7. What *do you understand to be* the proper subject-matter of Metaphysics? How far do you consider Metaphysics to be a science? Prove your answer?

§ 8. Analyse the *notion* of extension. Distinguish between this *notion* and that of space.

§ 9. State briefly the theory expressed in the following:—*Corpus dicit compositum ex materia et forma* [A historical question].

§ 10. Are space and Time substances, or attributes, or relations, or *forms*? Define the terms used in this question.

This evidence, at least in its cumulative force, would seem to be overwhelming: there is not one question from first to last, presupposing the existence of *Real Being*; or, in other words, there is not one question presupposing the *possibility* or the *existence* of the science to which they all purport to belong.

(2.) **Psychology**, in the Catholic sense, has been no less mercilessly dealt with. It will not be hard to exhibit convincing proofs of the truth of this allegation.

Catholic Psychology has two branches: *Dynamology*, which treats of the Human Faculties, and *Anthropology*, which treats of the Nature of Man, and more particularly of the Nature of the Soul. We must now see how each branch is treated in the University Programme.

(a.) As to *Dynamology*. Catholic writers, it may be remarked, attach great importance to this treatise. Sanseverino, for example, even in his smaller work (*Elementa*), devotes more than 230 pages to an exposition of it, and no inconsider-

* Set in 1882.

† Set in 1883.

‡ Set in 1884. This was the first year in which students of Catholic colleges presented themselves for examination in Metaphysics. This circumstance does not seem to have influenced the character of the papers in the least. The Examiners, as in duty bound, seem to have attended to the directions of the Programme, and not to extrinsic considerations. The year 1883 was the first in which the examinations were conducted by the Fellows. Since that date the historical and bibliographical element has disappeared, to a great extent, from the papers.

able space to the fundamental question of the distinction of the Faculties from the Essence of the Soul and from each other, which distinction, following the Angelic Master, he holds to be *real* in both cases.

A treatise on the Human Faculties is, of course, a palpable absurdity, if there be no Human Faculties. Now, a whole host of non-Catholic Philosophers of the day maintain that, properly speaking, there are no Faculties but only what they call "Mental or Psychical Phenomena." One or two quotations will be sufficient, in evidence of a fact which will be so familiar to many. "The 'faculty-hypothesis' must be regarded as productive of much error in Psychology."* "Herbart [and his followers] reject the whole theory of mental inherent faculties as chimerical."† "The Development theory of Mind,‡ which would trace all mental power to sensation as the primitive experience, is naturally opposed to the acknowledgment of distinct faculties."§

Here, then, we have the Catholic School unfolding a great body of doctrines purporting to constitute the Science of the Faculties of the Soul; and, on the other hand, we have not a few non-Catholic Schools maintaining that there is not, and that there cannot be, any such science. The University Programme cannot, without inconsistency, recognise these two contradictory systems. It must make its choice between them, and it has made it, as the following table will show. Terms expressing mere operations are, of course, omitted in both columns. By this omission no fewer than 13 out of a total of 15 terms disappear from the University Programme.

* Sully, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 26.

† Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 34, note.

‡ It is to be hoped that it is not this theory which is referred to in the University Programme under the heading "Laws of Mental Development." See below, p. 30, note.

§ Calderwood, *Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy* (in voce).

DYNAMOLOGY.

CATHOLIC PROGRAMME.

Faculties of the Soul in General.

The Vegetative Faculty.

The Sensitive Faculty :

(1) External.

(2) Internal (The Common Sense,
the Phantasy, the Estimative,
the Memory.)

The Intellectual Faculty :

(1) The Active Intellect.

(2) The Possible Intellect.

The Appetitive Faculty :

(1) The Sensitive Appetite.

(2) The Intellectual Appetite or
Will. The Freedom of the
Will.

The Locomotive Faculty.

UNIVERSITY PROGRAMME.

Appetite. Will.	{	Their chief characteristics and relation to <i>other</i> Faculties and mental <i>Phenomena</i> .
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This table tells an extraordinary tale and tells it thoroughly. Two points only require notice (1) how the term "Faculties" has been retained in a single instance ; (2) what remains as a subject-matter for this branch of the science of Psychology when the Faculties have been disposed of.

(1) It may well excite our wonder that the term "Faculties," even in this obscure corner of the Programme, should have escaped elimination. But there seems to be a simple explanation. We have it on high authority* that "the faculties may be retained as a convenient method of classification, *provided the language be properly explained*," that is, provided the language be explained away. Now, is the term "properly explained," in this sense, in the programme? Undoubtedly it is. According to the authority just quoted "the Faculty of the Will" is "properly explained" when it is identified with "a distinct class of mental phenomena." This is exactly what is done here. The phrase of the Programme, "Appetite and Will . . . and *other* faculties and mental phenomena," manifestly implies that the Appetite and Will are both faculties and phenomena, or, in other words, that faculties and phenomena are identical. Now faculties and phenomena could only be identified by the abolition† of either one or the other.

* Mansel, *ibidem*.

† "That this same 'Will' is *just nothing at all*, has been proved (in my opinion) beyond controversy by the late Dr. Brown, who has also expelled from the origin of entities those *fancied beings* called 'powers,' of which *this imaginary 'Will'* is one" (Austin). The foregoing passage is quoted by Ryland (*Psychology and Ethics for the London B.A.*, p. 107), for the purpose of showing that,

From the nature of the case, there can, of course, be no manner of doubt as to which it is that is to be abolished, and, even if the nature of the case permitted of a doubt, the phraseology of the Programme is such as to exclude it. Not only is the term "phenomena" obtrusively prominent on the Programme occurring as it does three times—once in each section—but also its meaning is defined in Section I. by what some logicians call the Method of Definition by Complete Enumeration. Not one instance, so enumerated, is an instance of what would be classified, in the Catholic Programme, as a faculty.

(2). The question may be asked, what remains as subject-matter for this branch of Psychology when the faculties have been effaced?

It might have been expected that, with the disappearance of the faculties, the work of demolition would be completed, and that we would still have "mental operations" with which to occupy ourselves. But no; operations* must go too, or, if preserved, must be "properly explained." The reason of this is that the "term operation, as employed in the older [meaning thereby the Catholic] Psychology is the correlative of the term faculty or power,"† which, of course, as having been so recently done to death, it is inconvenient to be reminded of. What, then, have we remaining? We have "phenomena of the mind, mental states, psychical facts, or whatever else we choose to call them."‡ If these are all we have left, it perhaps does not matter very much what we call them.

Still, this mystical phrase, "psychical phenomena," must be called upon to give an account of itself. What, then, does it mean in the new Psychology? Writers of the school are

'assuming the accuracy of the Association School's account of Will, the question, 'Is the Will Free?' can have *no meaning*.' Clearly not; but is it not, under such circumstances, matter for just criticism that the question "Is the Will Free?" should find no place—visible at least to the naked eye—on the Programme; and is it not also strange that it is precisely from writers of this Association School, and even from those members of it most noted for their polemic against Free Will—such as Professor Bain and his associate, Mr. Sully—that a great number of recent University questions in Psychology have been taken, and taken in many instances *verbatim*? The Examiners might surely have reflected how certain students would be to follow in their wake.

* With the practical proscription of so many convenient technical terms, it becomes a matter of some difficulty to phrase a psychological question neatly. Perhaps the University Examiners had some sense of this difficulty when they set the following not very intelligible question, at the recent B.A. Examination: "State and comment on some of the leading classifications that have been made of the *fundamental facts of mind*."

† *Outlines*, p. 18.

‡ *Outlines*, p. 1.

not in the habit of elaborating severely accurate definitions, but we can at least gather very clearly what they do *not* mean by the term. That they do *not* mean the faculties or the operations of the soul has been already shown; that they do not mean the *substance* of the soul is even more certain; for "it is agreed by all that in Psychology we are not concerned with the substance of mind,"* "the question as to the substance of mind being a philosophical or metaphysical one, the solution of which does not seem necessary to Psychology."† Nothing therefore remains to be covered by the phrase except the Accidents (qualities or attributes) of the soul. But do we know these Accidents as they are in themselves, or merely as they appear to us? In the opinion of these writers, this is apparently another "metaphysical question, the solution of which does not seem to be necessary to Psychology," and were we to propose it, we should probably be recommended to debate the question at our leisure with Kant and his numerous followers.‡

Here, then, we have the extraordinary phenomenon of a Psychology or Treatise on the Soul, which finds it unnecessary to recognise either the *substance*, or the *faculties*, or the *operations*, or even the *name* of the soul, and which also finds it unnecessary to determine whether the psychical phenomena, about which alone it purports to concern itself, are realities or mere appearances. Has such a Psychology any claim to a position in Philosophy? Some of its ablest exponents, as for instance, Mr. Sully,§ are painstaking in their efforts to satisfy us that it has not. Has it even a claim to be regarded as a science at all? So long as science means "the cognition of things *through their causes*," it is manifest that no knowledge, however ample or accurate, of mere facts, and, *a fortiori*, of mere phenomena *considered irrespectively of their causes*, can be regarded as such. Now writers of this school, limiting themselves, as they *profess* at least to do, to *exclusively*

* Ryland, *ibidem*, p. 1.

† Sully, *ibidem*, p. 2.

‡ It is with sincere regret that we are compelled to place in this category so brilliant and powerful a writer as Sir William Hamilton. We quote a few passages from his works: "Experience and observation afford *mere appearances*" (*Metaphysics*, I., p. 125). "Whatever we know is not known as it is, *but only as it seems to us to be*" (*Ibidem*, I., p. 146). "Mind and matter exist to us only in their *qualities*, and these *qualities exist to us only as they are known by us, i.e., as Phenomena*" (*Discussions*, p. 61).

§ Sully, *Outlines*, p. 2, 14, &c.; *Illusions*, p. 14, 36, &c.

empirical* methods, have no means of investigating such causes and do not consequently make the attempt.

It would seem, therefore, that this new so-called Psychology, as compared with the old, possesses little or no philosophic or scientific value. Is it not, then, an unaccountable anomaly that it should so completely overshadow the old Psychology, both in the Programme and in the examination papers of the University?

ANTHROPOLOGY.

(b.) Anthropology, it need hardly be remarked, constitutes the very essence of Catholic Psychology. It is its exalted aim, amongst other things, to solve all the problems of the soul. Its interest is, therefore, second only to that of theology, with which its connection is intimate and essential. Catholic philosophers develop it with a rigour of scientific method and with a fulness of argument and illustration proportioned to its immense importance. Unfortunately, an exactly opposite course is adopted by the great body of recent non-Catholic Psychologists. While they expound at unending length Phenomenal Psychology, they can hardly be said even to *attempt* a scientific treatment of Anthropology. It is plain that even the most orthodox of them have but a weak faith in its value, while a large number seem disposed to agree with Dean Mansel† in boasting that “Kant had exploded Rational Psychology” [or Anthropology].

Now, the Royal University Programme is constructed upon the principle of recognising equally every School of Philosophy, Catholic and non-Catholic. But how is a programme of Rational Psychology to be devised, which will be common ground for Catholics and philosophers of the school of Kant, for example? If it set forth the Catholic Programme it is ignoring the fact that Kant and his disciples claim to

* There are two such methods: (1) the Method of Internal or Subjective Observation, and (2) the Method of External or Objective Observation. By the former is meant the observation of mental phenomena as they present themselves in our own individual mind; by the latter is meant the observation of mental phenomena as they present themselves externally in other minds, as, for example, by looks, gestures, &c., but particularly by action of the brain and nerves. All writers of this school seem to be Empiricists, holding, consequently, with Professor Bain, that “*nothing is to be affirmed as true except on the warrant of experience*” (*Logic. Deduction*, p. 13). This new Psychology, in respect to its subject-matter, is termed *Phenomenal*, and, in respect to its methods, *Empirical*.

† *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 34, note.

have “exploded” that programme, and to have shown that the science, of which it purports to be the programme, is but a chimera; if it eliminate altogether the Catholic Programme, it is of course ignoring the system held by an overwhelming majority of the classes for which the University was intended. Logically, it is impossible to find a *media via*. The Royal University Programme represents an attempt to find one. The result of the attempt can, as usual, be tabularly exhibited:—

ANTHROPOLOGY.

CATHOLIC PROGRAMME.

Simplicity of the Human Soul.
 Spirituality of the Human Soul.
 Unity of the Human Soul.
 Substantiality of the Human Soul.
 Essence of the Human Soul.
 Union of Soul and Body.
 Mode of the Union of Soul and Body.
 Consequences of the Union of Soul and Body.
 Human Personality.
 Seat of the Human Soul.
 Origin of the Human Soul.
 Immortality of the Human Soul.

UNIVERSITY PROGRAMME.

Simplicity of the Human *Mind*.

 Nature and Properties of the Human *Mind*.
 Mutual relations of the *Mind* and Body. *Mind*, Matter, and their different Modes and Qualities.*

 Immortality of the Human *Mind*.

It will thus be seen that the *media via* has been found by the rejection of many of the most vital problems, and by the perversion of the remainder. The process of perversion alone calls for a word of comment.

That the substitution of the term “Mind” for “Soul” in Anthropological questions amounts to a perversion of them, so complete as to divest them of almost all meaning, seems at least to be the view of Professor Bain. “The schoolmen,” he tells us, “debated whether the *Mind* was in every part of the body or only in the whole; the question is insoluble, because unreal. It is not an intelligible proposition, it is a jargon.”† The question as thus stated may, indeed, be a jargon, but if so, it is a jargon of Professor Bain’s own making. The question which the schoolmen debated was a very different one: “Is the Human *Soul* in the whole body, and in every part of the body, and, if so, how?” This may be a difficult question, but it is at least a very intelligible one.

* This heading occurs in the Programme of Ontology, but it seems to me to belong rather to that of Anthropology.

† *Mental Science*, p. 400 and p. 4.

The following question was set at the recent Royal University B.A. *Pass* Examination:—"State briefly, with comments, the arguments adduced to prove that *mind* possesses substantial existence *apart from matter?*" It would be interesting to know how far Catholic or any other candidates found that question "real and intelligible." If the terms were interpreted in their right sense, it might, perhaps, be doubted whether the proposition would be either provable or true. Considering the connection in which it occurs, the sense it is intended to convey is, probably,* this: "State briefly, with comments, the arguments adduced to prove that the Soul is an immaterial substance." If this be the correct meaning, the question is a forcible illustration of the lengths to which the Examiners felt constrained to go, in order to avoid the use of the term "Soul."

But it is time to ask the question plainly: Why do so many recent non-Catholic philosophers seem to abhor so utterly the use of the word "Soul?" The reason is not far to seek. The term "Soul" does not connote any special faculty, operation, or phenomenon: it represents formally and explicitly the *substance* of the animating principle—the idea of substance is the first which it calls up, substance being the first element of its essence. Now, all these philosophers † are agreed in denying, or ignoring, or explaining away, the substantiality of the soul. Hence, their detestation of the term.

On the other hand, Mind distinctly connotes Intellect. Any dictionary would supply us with that information, if we required it. "Popularly," as even Mr. Sully admits, "a man of Mind is a man of Intellect." Does it embrace in its comprehension the attribute of substantiality? It is unnecessary to discuss the abstract question; Phenomenists and others with whom we are here chiefly concerned, are unanimous in holding that it does not. In the Cartesian and kindred

* Can it mean, "State briefly, with comments, the arguments adduced to prove that the Soul continues to exist after its separation from the Body?" The argument in the text will hold equally well in this interpretation.

† Though it may be deemed superfluous, I quote a single passage in proof:—"If we accept the belief that there is an underlying *ego* distinct from the aggregate of feelings and ideas at any given moment, the Libertarian view [as to the Freedom of the Will] will present few difficulties of importance. If, however, we accept the Association view in its most consistent development (as, for instance, by Hume, Spencer, and apparently Mr. Bain)—viz., that such an *ego* does not exist, but that the entire group of *psychical states* which constitute the antecedent of a given action constitute also *myself* at that moment, the Libertarian view can hardly be rendered sufficiently intelligible to us to merit even the title of an illusion."—Ryland, *Psychology and Ethics*, p. 109.

Philosophy an attempt is made to set up Mind as a synonym for Soul; in Phenomenal Psychology it is sought to identify it with a *substanceless* Soul. Cartesians would employ both terms indifferently: Phenomenal Psychologists would rigorously proscribe the one, and exclusively employ the other.

Under such circumstances, is it not a painful and ugly fact that never yet within the philosophical jurisdiction of the Royal University has the word "Soul" been put in type?

We are now in a position to appreciate the full significance of the substitution of "Mind" for "Soul" in many of the leading questions of Anthropology. It amounts to this: such questions as those of the Origin, Seat, and Immortality of the Soul are meaningless and absurd, unless the Substantiality of the Soul is presupposed; and in an examination at which Phenomenists and others are free to present themselves, that Substantiality is not presupposed—but rather the contrary—when the term "Mind" is employed.

Ethics.

The Programme of Ethics has next to be considered. I begin, at once, by contrasting it with the corresponding Catholic one.

CATHOLIC PROGRAMME

General Ethics.

The Last End of Man.*

Human Actions; their nature and conditions (Voluntariness and Liberty): Impediments to Voluntariness and Liberty (Ignorance, Concupiscence, Fear and Violence); Imputability of Human Actions; their Merit and Demerit.

Morality of Human Actions; its nature, ultimate criterion, sources (object matter, circumstances, and end). Faculty by which morality is apprehended.

The Eternal Law, the Natural Law, its nature, existence, immutability, evidence, sanction, obligation, &c.

Positive Law, its nature, necessity, obligation, &c.

Conscience; its nature, kinds, rules, &c.

The Habits, Virtues, and Vices.

UNIVERSITY PROGRAMME.

General Ethics.

Various, sources, occasions, and causes of human action, and their mutual relations; Pleasure, Pain, Aversion, the Affections, &c.

Theories concerning the nature, source and criteria of Morality.

Theories of the nature and origin of Moral Judgment and the Moral Faculty.[†]

Moral Obligation; its ground.

Conscience; its Nature, and Functions.

Exposition and Classification of the Virtues.

Leading Ethical Systems of Ancient and Modern Times.

* "Assertio 2nda:—Nulla naturalis Ethica statui potest abstrahendo a natura et fine hominis." Vallet, *Prælectiones Philosophicæ*, II, p. 356.

[†] In reference to this second appearance of the term "Faculty," it may be observed (1) that it is used in the same connection by Professor Bain, and that it is at once "properly explained" by being identified with "phenomenon," or "fact" of mind (*Moral Science*, p. ii. and p. 449); (2) that Catholic Philosophers do not admit the existence of any "Moral Faculty" distinct from the Intellect.

CATHOLIC PROGRAMME.

Special Ethics.

Ethics of the Individual. Duties of Man towards God, towards others, towards himself [including such questions as Religious Worship, Liberty of Thought, Self-defence, Suicide, Veracity, Homicide, Duelling, Contracts, &c.]

Rights of Man in general; their existence, inequality, defence, &c,

Right to the possession of material goods.

Ethics of Domestic Society, Marriage, its nature and properties.

Duties of Parents, Masters, &c.

Ethics of Civil Society. Nature, origin, and end of Civil Society. Civil Power, its origin and functions, (legislative, executive, and judicial). Forms of Government, Subjects and their Rulers, &c.

Ethics of International Society [Including such questions as War, Conquest, &c.]

UNIVERSITY PROGRAMME.

Exposition and classification of duties.

A few brief comments will suffice to show that the right column, like all its predecessors, exhibits Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.

(1) According to our never-failing friend, Professor Bain,* two questions—"The standard (or, What does virtue consist in?), and the Psychology of our moral nature (or, What is the power or faculty of the mind which discovers and enforces virtue?)"—almost entirely exhaust modern Ethics." When the reader learns that this writer, usually so diffuse, disposes of these two questions in 25 pages, and then devotes the remaining 290 pages to "a full detail of all Ethical Systems, ancient and modern," he may find it hard to resist the conclusion that in "Modern Ethics," as conceived by Professor Bain, the historical element predominates somewhat alarmingly over the ethical. Now, how far does the Royal University Programme countenance such a conception of Ethics? Anyone who will cast out the first item as belonging most distinctly to Psychology, and who will then note the italicised words and phrases in other items, will be in a fair position to judge. The last heading in General Ethics, which manifestly appertains to the History of Philosophy, points far more distinctly to Professor Bain's work than to any other with which I am acquainted.

(2) Despite the denials of so many recent Ethical writers,

* *Moral Science*, page 432.

it is clearly axiomatic that without Liberty there is neither responsibility nor morality, and it is equally axiomatic that any pretended Science of Ethics which does not presuppose the Freedom of the Human Will is baseless and self-contradictory. Does the Royal University Programme, in sketching the science of Ethics, postulate the Freedom of the Will? By no means, nor could it, considering the principle upon which it is framed. Does the Programme, either here or elsewhere, even open the subject for discussion? So far as I am able to see, it does not; nor up to the present is any trace of it to be found in any of the University examination papers.

(3) It is a thesis in Catholic Philosophy—and a thesis supported by the authority of the *Syllabus*,*—that without reference to the existence and attributes of God a science of Ethics is impossible. Yet the University Programme, though excluding Natural Theology, has to attempt to construct one. It is not wonderful, therefore, that it should completely fail. The prohibition of any reference to Natural Theology is, perhaps, the explanation of the omission in the Programme of any reference, or at least of any explicit reference, to the Eternal or the Natural Law.

(4) What are we to say of the University Programme of Special Ethics? The safest thing, perhaps, to say is, that it is well adapted to baffle criticism. The phrase, "Exposition and Classification of Duties," is so vague that one is unable to say how much or how little it includes. But the very quality which makes it "as the air invulnerable" to the critic, makes it practically valueless to the candidate: for what is the use of a guide which, whatever else it does, gives no guidance? And it must be said, in general, that it is too much the practice of phrases of the Programme to "make themselves air into which they vanish," just at the moment when "we burn in desire to question them further." Witness the references to the Will and to the Soul.

The University Programme of Ethics contains five sections. Of these, four and a portion of the fifth are devoted to the exposition of General Ethics; a fraction of a section is adjudged sufficient for a reference to Special Ethics. This arrangement contains a very distinct suggestion as to the relative importance of the two branches of the science in the

* The following is the 56th amongst the condemned propositions of the *Syllabus*: "*Morum leges divina haud egent sanctione, minimeque opus est ut humanæ leges ad naturæ jus conformentur aut obligandi vim a Deo accipiant.*"

estimation of the University. But a suggestion decidedly more distinct is to be found in the following analysis of recent University B.A. Examination Papers in Ethics:—

	In 1884.	In 1883.	In 1882.
Total number of questions set ...	9	10	8
Number of questions referring to			
General Ethics ...	9	9	8
„ „ Special Ethics ...	0	1	0

If, therefore, figures and facts prove anything, they prove that, at the Royal University, General Ethics is almost everything, and Special Ethics is little or nothing. Is this the view of Catholic Ethicians? Far from it; they all devote more space to Special than to General Ethics; many of them nearly twice as much.* Is it, on the other hand, the view of non-Catholic writers? For the most part, it undoubtedly is; indeed, the more modern of them, as Professor Bain has already told us, have, properly speaking, no Special Ethics at all; and of none of them is this more eminently true than of those† to whom it has been found possible to trace some recent University questions.

With all this evidence before us, can anything be plainer than that the Ethics of the Royal University is the negation of all that is most valuable in Catholic Ethics?

Next in order comes the

History of Philosophy.

There is, strange to say, no Programme in this subject for the B.A. Examination.‡ The Examination Papers, therefore, are our sole guide as to the range and character of the questions that may be expected. As, however, up to the present but two such papers have been set, the amount of information that can be thus gleaned is necessarily scanty. Such as it is, it is here presented.

The following table includes a complete list of all the philosophers, in reference to whose systems any question (counting alternatives) has hitherto been set; it shows also the number of such questions. For purposes of comparison,

* Thus, amongst recent writers:

Zigliara	devotes 124 pages to	<i>General Ethics</i> and	211 to	<i>Special</i> .
Sylvestro	„ 169 „	„	281 to	„
Liberatore	„ 111 „	„	275 to	„
Costa-Rossetti	„ 194 „	„	607 to	„

† As, for example, Sidgwick, Bain, Calderwood.

‡ There is a programme for the M.A. Examination.—See *Calendar*, p. 60.

the names of a few of the more distinguished philosophers, not referred to in the questions, have been inserted :—

Plato	..	..	..	..	0
Aristotle	..	..	..	..	0
St. Augustine		..	..	..	0
St. Anselm		..	..	..	0
Albert the Great		..	..	..	0
St. Thomas		..	..	..	0
Scotus	..	..	..	..	0
Suarez	..	..	..	..	0
Scholastic Philosophers in general				..	1
Descartes	..	..	..	..	2
Spinoza	..	..	..	..	1
Leibnitz	..	..	..	..	1
Berkeley	..	..	..	..	3
Reid	..	..	..	..	1
Kant	..	..	..	..	4
Writers subsequent to Kant			..	..	0

There is another way of appreciating the significance of these papers, which we shall now consider.

Counting alternatives, nine questions were set in 1883. Of these nine, *eight* referred to the period from Descartes inclusively to Kant inclusively, and again, of these eight *not one* referred to the History of Catholic Philosophy during that period. The ninth question was the following :—"What did the Scholastic Philosophers understand by the terms, *Phantasma*, *Species Impressa*, *Intellectus Agens*, *Intellectus Possibilis* ?

In 1884 also nine questions were set. Again of these nine, *eight* referred to the period from Descartes inclusively to Kant inclusively, and again not *one* of these eight referred to the History of Catholic Philosophy during that period. The ninth question was this :

"Write short but clear historical and critical notes on *six* of these adages :—

1. "Singulare dum sentitur, universale dum intelligitur.
2. "Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora.
3. "Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem.
4. "Purpurea, iliacæ, amabimus, edentuli.
5. "Cognitio nostra omnis a mente primam originem, a sensibus exordium habet primum.
6. "REUBAU.
7. "Sentire semper idem et non sentire ad idem recidunt.
8. "Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu ; excipe, nisi ipse intellectus.
9. "Esse est percipi.
10. "Contentum contenti est contentum continentis."

Of these ten, the only ones, so far as I am able to judge, which are *exclusively* scholastic, are n. 4* and n. 6. It is in the last degree unlikely that these were of any special advantage to Catholic candidates.

These papers, then, proceed upon the assumption that the period from Descartes to Kant is the golden era of Philosophy. Is such an assumption legitimate? Most non-Catholic writers, no doubt, regard it as such; Catholic writers, on the other hand, are apt to regard it as the period which witnessed the rapid decline of genuine Philosophy, and the equally rapid rise of modern Scepticism. The University, so far from standing indifferent as between these opposing views, practically identifies itself with the non-Catholic one.

Have we not, then, in this last subject, as in all the preceding ones, the most solid grounds for complaint?†

Method of Examination.

The Catholic and non-Catholic systems of Philosophy differ no less notably in their method than in their matter. It remains to be seen with which of the rival methods—if with either—the University allies itself. Attention must be directed to the following points:—

I. Terminology.—The vast importance of having philo-

* See Mansel's *Aldrich*, preface, p. vi.

† No reference has been made in the text to the Programme of Formal Logic, and but a single reference has been made to that of Applied Logic; reference, however, will soon be made to the non-Catholic character of the Terminology and Quotations introduced into the examination papers set under those programmes. Indeed, in no instance, was the system of transcribing questions *verbatim* from a Non-Catholic text-book carried so far as in the papers set in Formal Logic both at the Second University and at the B.A. examinations last year. It is right, however, to say that the work from which they were taken is regarded as one of the least exceptionable and most valuable of its kind. But was it not leaving too much to chance to take so many questions from a book which had been but a few months in the market?

In respect of their subject-matter, the Catholic and non-Catholic systems do not, of course, differ so diametrically in Logic, and especially in Formal Logic, as they do in other branches of Philosophy. Yet they differ most materially. Amongst the topics more distinctively special to the Catholic system may be enumerated such subjects as Demonstration, Truth, Certitude, Scepticism; and such criteria as Evidence, Intuition (*Intelligentia*), Memory, Testimony. The notice taken of these topics in the papers hitherto set is as scant as the notice of topics more distinctively special to non-Catholics—such as Induction and its Methods—is abundant. It may be doubted whether the Programme includes at all the subject of Scepticism; yet, at a time when it is so dominant, an opportunity should surely be afforded of examining it, at least in its leading forms.

sophical questions couched in an intelligible phraseology* need not be dwelt upon, nor need the great superiority of the Catholic terminology, especially in respect of stability and precision, be pointed out.† But it requires to be carefully noted that, owing to the method of examination hitherto pursued at the Royal University, terminology acquires an importance totally disproportionate to its claims. It was the tradition of Catholic schools to look for proofs of clear logic in power to “state a question,” for proofs of strong logic in power to “prove the Minors,” and for proofs of keen and trenchant logic in power to “solve the objections.” But “stating,” and “proving,” and “solving” seem to be going out of fashion, at least in Metaphysics and Ethics, and “commenting,” and “discussing,” and “explaining terms” seem to be coming in. The tendency of this change, which is from every point of view strongly to be deprecated, is, of course, to give an abnormal value to the interpretation of technical language. The following analysis of the questions set at the B.A. Honour Examination in *Metaphysics* and *Ethics* in 1884, will make this clear.

Total number of questions	...	...	23
Number of questions involving the explanation of technical terms, or a comment upon pas- sages couched in technical phraseology	...	...	17
Number of questions implicitly or explicitly re- quiring proof or disproof of any important thesis	...	...	7

Under these circumstances, it becomes a point of great interest to determine whether Catholic terminology has been treated with the same neglect and contempt as Catholic Philosophy has been shown to be. The analysis, now to be submitted, of all the technical terms found in the B.A. examination papers in 1884, will determine this point beyond the possibility of doubt.

Number of exclusively non-Catholic terms	...	17‡
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* It would, of course, be quite easy to frame a set of questions—strictly within the limits of the Programme—which would be as unintelligible to non-Catholic candidates as some of the recent specimens are likely to have been to average Catholic candidates.

† “The schoolmen were unrivalled in the construction of technical language, and their definitions, I think, have seldom been altered but to be spoiled.”—*Mill, System of Logic*, I. p. 29.

‡ This number is really under the mark. A pair of opposed terms is in every instance counted as one. That the non-Catholic terms employed in the question have not yet found a permanent position in philosophical nomenclature, may,

Number of exclusively Catholic terms ... 1 (*)

II. Quotations.—Quotations constitute a grievance of no inconsiderable magnitude. It is very unfair to examine a student in Hermeneutics, while professing to examine him solely in Metaphysics or Ethics; but if it be judged necessary so to examine him, he should not be denied the usual Hermeneutical helps, such as the context of the passage, the scope of the writer, &c.

Two serious complaints have to be made in reference to this matter:—(1) not a few of the quotations are unintelligible, (2) almost all the quotations are from the non-Catholic side.

(1) As specimens of quotations unintelligible to candidates not acquainted with the context, or at least with the writings of authors of the same school, the following may be given:—

1. Comment upon the following passage:—"The older Psychology of Locke and his followers overlooked the effects of individual 'nature.' Modern writers, are, perhaps, more likely to overlook the effects of 'nurture.'" (B.A. *Metaphysics*, 1884).

2. Briefly comment on the following passages:—

(a) "As in the world without, so in the world within us, the light by guiding us proves that it is its office to guide us."

(b) "An abstract question in morality is distinct from a question respecting the constitution of man's moral nature." (B.A. *Ethics*, 1884)

3. Explain and discuss:—"Indeed from a practical point of view Egoism and Utilitarianism may fairly be regarded as extremes between which common-sense morality is a kind of *media via*" (*ibidem*).

4. Explain and illustrate the following remark:—"By continual use the middle links (of our trains of thought) frequently drop out or pass so swiftly as not to touch the notice." (B.A. *Metaphysics*, 1883).

5. "To refer all pleasures to Association is to acknowledge no sound but echo." (M.A. *Metaphysics*, 1883).

6. Explain and illustrate:—"By the doctrine of Causation I mean the notion or first principle that all things come of effective will."† (M.A. *Metaphysics*, 1883.)

7. "Taste is its own evidence, but conscience does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decision." (B.A. *Ethics*, 1883).

These instances by no means exhaust the list. More competent authorities will be best able to judge whether such exercises, instead of affording to students a wholesome mental discipline, are not, on the contrary, calculated to foster in them

perhaps, be inferred from the fact that *not* one of the seventeen terms above referred to is to be found (at least in the same sense) in even the latest edition (1876) of *Fleming's Vocabulary*. Indeed several of them were probably not in use for more than a few years, and one or two may not have been in use for even so long. I append a few specimens:—Preservation of Concepts, Individual Nature, Obstructive Association, Organic Sense, Egoistic Hedonism, Egoism, Common Sense Morality, &c.

* Matter and Form.

† It is not often that one has to complain of questions which make unwarrantable doctrinal assumptions. A few of the kind have occurred; this is, in my opinion, one of them.

the very vicious habit of speaking or writing about things which they do not understand. It is enough for the present purpose to point out that whatever chance candidates more familiar with the modes of thought and forms of speech which characterise such passages, might have of comprehending them, Catholic candidates, prepared on Catholic lines, could have little or none.

(2). In proof of the allegation, that the quotations were nearly all from the non-Catholic side, the following analysis of *all* the B.A. papers set in 1884 is given :—

Number of quotations,* from non-Catholic authors, ..	21
Catholic† ,, ..	2

A second analysis of the same paper, from a different point of view, may be even more decisive :—

Number of quotations from <i>non-Catholic text-books</i> , ‡ 10	
„ „	Catholic text-books, I
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9
10	10
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86	86
87	87
88	88
89	89
90	90
91	91
92	92
93	93
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95	95
96	96
97	97
98	98
99	99
100	100

III. **System of Teaching**—Under the Catholic system of teaching, never more strongly enforced than at present, students study in the main but a single system of Philosophy—substantially the Philosophy of St. Thomas—and discuss other systems only in so far as they have points of contact with that. The non-Catholic system is, as usual, the antithesis of the Catholic. It is eclectic in its character, resolving itself, to a great extent, into a critical examination of works representing conflicting schools and systems. Of this fact the calendar of any non-Catholic University College will afford proofs sufficient to those who may desire them.

But the inevitable question arises:—How stands the University as between the contending parties? The following items from the programme (not of the History of Philosophy) but of *Metaphysics* and *Ethics* supply the familiar answer. "The student will be expected to show an acquaintance with the chief metaphysical systems from Descartes § to the present day, and with the leading ethical systems of ancient and modern times."

* Quotations, given as logical exercises, are, of course, not counted.

† One of the two being the poet, Alexander Pope.

‡ Two or three of these, though *verbatim* from the text-books, are not formally acknowledged. The number given in the text merely represents those I have been able to trace; there are, doubtlessly, several others.

§ The object of drawing the line at Descartes is sufficiently transparent.

No serious question can now be raised as to whether the course of philosophy, sketched in the programme and developed in the examination papers of the Royal University, is of a character to supply Catholic students with the "*pollens ac robustum doctrinæ pabulum*," or to promote the "*philosophandi ratio*" contemplated by the Sovereign Pontiff. It would seem to have been proved, to the last degree of evidence which the nature of the subject admits, that such a course is calculated to defeat utterly at least two out of the three objects* which the Encyclical "*Æterni Patris*" seeks to accomplish.

That the system of philosophy at present enforced by the Royal University, is not the Philosophy of St. Thomas, either in outline, or in detail, either in respect of Matter, or in respect of Method, either according to the letter, or according to the spirit, no one who has followed this discussion so far can, I venture to think, have any reasonable doubt.† Still less could one doubt that the student who aims at achieving any notable distinction in Philosophy at the Royal University, under existing conditions, must, in defiance of the injunctions of the Encyclical, and of the laws of the Church, make a much closer and more habitual study of most objectionable non-Catholic textbooks than he does of his own, and must familiarise himself more thoroughly with their substance, spirit, phraseology, methods, problems, and minutiae.

Nothing remains, therefore, but to inquire whether the study of Philosophy, as at present directed by the Royal University, is well adapted to secure the third object specified as conducive to the complete fulfilment of the designs of the Encyclical, viz., "that Catholic students shall have a competent knowledge of leading and important questions special to non-Catholic Philosophy."

It might at first sight appear that at least for this purpose its success would be assured. Such, however, is far from being the case. The following table represents the facts material to the decision of this point so far as I am able to

* If it be asked, Could not Catholic candidates study the Catholic Philosophy in view of their collegiate examinations, and study the University Philosophy in view of the University Examinations? the answer is (1) Why are not non-Catholic candidates called upon to do likewise? Why should Catholic competitors be compelled to carry double weights? (2) Students should begin with the right Philosophy and not with the wrong; (3) Students will study with an all-absorbing ardour subjects which bring within their reach the coveted Honours and Prizes of the University.

† In addition, it is to be remarked that the Programme does not even purport to include Natural Theology or Cosmology.

appreciate them. It is a rough analysis of all the B.A. papers* in *Metaphysics* and *Ethics* set in 1883 and 1884.

Total number of questions <i>special to non-Catholic</i>				
<i>Philosophy,</i>	.	.	.	32
Number of leading questions,	.	.	.	11
Number of minor questions,	.	.	.	21

Such an analysis cannot, from the nature of the case, be absolutely reliable; but no one, I think, could glance at any University paper in these subjects without being struck with the great prominence given to queries of an obscure and insignificant character. It is, no doubt, a disadvantage to Examiners, especially in setting an Honour Paper, not to be free to set questions which test whether a student's knowledge of his business is as thorough with respect to minutiae as it is with respect to the broader questions. Yet, questions referring to the minutiae whether of Catholic or of non-Catholic text-books, are clearly inadmissible under the system of common papers—unless we are to hold the extraordinary theory that both classes of students should be equally acquainted with both sets of text-books. It may be added, that care seems to have been taken that such questions of Catholic Philosophy as were admitted should not refer to minor points. A similar analysis of the paper, as above, yields the following results:—

* The Programme, in reference to subjects special to Non-Catholic Philosophy, is too vague to offer any materials for comment. The subjects of this class, to which it gives greatest prominence, are Induction and Subsidiary Operations, Association, Emotions, and Mental Development. It is quite fair to require that the first three subjects should be brought under the notice of Catholic students; but it is surely too much to assume, upon the authority of these headings, that he should know everything relating to these subjects which may have been written by authors who treat them at enormously disproportionate length. The phrase "Laws of Mental Development" clearly involves the assumption that there *is* Mental Development. Now "Mental Development" as a *technical term* (see p. 13, note †) is practically monopolised by the Evolution School, and means "Evolution as applied to Mind." Are we then called upon to accept the Evolutional Psychology which, according to Mr. Sully, is the "apex of the Science" (*Outlines*, p. 68)? It is incredible that anything of the kind should have been intended; but why was such a phrase introduced at all? Will it be said that it need not necessarily mean anything more than the familiar fact of the improvement and expansion of the mind under exercise, &c.? I would ask: in what sense is a programme *common* when its formulæ can be, and will be, understood by opposing schools in totally different senses? Is it the sound or the sense that should be attended to, and which of them is it that is common? But while one may complain that "Mental Development" *seems* thus to be assumed, no one could complain if Mental Development in the accepted Evolutional sense were proposed for discussion. It is just the sort of a question which is fully entitled to it.

Total number of questions <i>special to Catholic</i>				
<i>Philosophy,</i>	.	.	.	8
Number of leading questions	.	.	.	7 or 8
Number of minor questions	.	.	.	1 or 0

The position, then, of the Catholic candidate with respect to questions of non-Catholic Philosophy is this: so much of his time and of his strength has to be expended upon questions of minute detail and of little importance, that it becomes impossible for him to obtain the necessary helps towards acquiring a thorough or masterly knowledge of the really prominent questions, especially as there are no Catholic text-books dealing with them in the English language.

It is now time to bring to a close this heavy indictment of the existing system of University Examination in Philosophy. The evidence in support of the indictment has been drawn out to such length, because it appeared to be of the first importance to show, not by the aid of abstract reasoning, but by the logic of hard facts, proved in every instance *tabulis et testibus*, that there exists a grievance, real, substantial, perhaps unbearable—a grievance, the magnitude of which is perhaps not fully realised by many having authority and responsibility in the matter.

If the Catholics of Ireland formed but a handful of the general community, or if they had open to them the alternative of a Catholic University—not to say an option as amongst various Catholic Universities—or if they were agreed that they had no philosophy worthy of the attention of any thinking man, the grievance, now proved to exist, might not be felt to be so bitter. But inasmuch as the reverse of each of the first two hypotheses is a notorious fact, and inasmuch as, in respect of the third, many of us cherish the profound conviction that an average article of St. Thomas contains more of genuine philosophic thought, and exhibits more of genuine philosophic method than an average volume of the so-called philosophical literature of the day, it becomes a grievance, in the last degree galling, to find that the University, which purports to show strict fair play as between Catholics and non-Catholics, and which might easily be excused, if, under the circumstances, it paid some special attention to the wants

of Catholics, should make ample recognition of the upstart and ephemeral systems of the hour, and should reserve all its neglect for our grand old Catholic Philosophy and all its belongings—its venerable history, its austere method, its matchless terminology, its robust and invigorating exercises, its profound and ennobling investigations.

This is, however, but the sentimental side of the grievance. As a consequence of the exceedingly one-sided character of the Programme and of the papers—both in respect of matter and in respect of form—a Catholic candidate, who, as directed by the highest authority, prizes his own Philosophy above every other, and who makes it a first object to master it in full detail, is compelled either to abandon altogether the subject of Philosophy at the University, or to be content to see rivals not possessing more than a fraction of his ability, training, or attainments, furnished with the means of ignominiously vanquishing him.

But perhaps as sufferance has been so long “the badge of all our tribe” we might find it possible to bear even this. Beyond this, however, there is, it seems to me, that which cannot be borne; and it is this: (1) that the University System, as in actual operation, is in violent conflict with the method of Philosophical teaching prescribed by the Sovereign Pontiff, tending, as it does, to defeat the three great objects of the Encyclical *Æterni Patris*, and to defeat the primary object more completely than any other; (2) that it tends to substitute for the “golden wisdom” of St. Thomas and his no less golden method, such a wretched residuum of both as is left to us by Empiricists, Phenomenists, and other semi-Sceptics; (3) that it tends to divert the attention of students from the great problems of Philosophy, and to direct it towards comparatively insignificant questions; and (4) that it tends rather to fill the ear with sounds and to cram the memory with words than to satisfy the cravings of the intellect after higher truth.*

Under the hard conditions now detailed, there must be some excuse for us if we complain. Some of us who complain most loudly are amongst the most willing to bear testimony to the beneficial influence of the University in other departments.

* It will be seen, therefore, that so far from complaining of the difficulty of any paper, or of any examination, in respect of *matter*, we complain rather that there was not *more matter* and less terminology and triviality.

FIRST PLAN.

(2nd Form. A reformed Programme.)

This form would agree with the preceding in advocating a common programme, a common paper, and common prizes; but it would differ from it in proposing that the examination should be conducted, not under the existing programme, but under a reformed programme, framed, however, upon the same principle—the principle of recognising equally Catholic and non-Catholic Philosophy. Some might be inclined to think that, subject to this modification, the plan of a common paper would work satisfactorily.

Waiving the very important question, as to how far non-Catholics would be willing to consent to any material alteration of the programme in a Catholic direction, there would yet remain, as it seems to me, unconquerable difficulties in the way of such a plan. Some of these difficulties have reference to the *Form* of the Questions: the more important ones have reference to the *Matter*.

I. *The Form of the Questions.* Under this heading there arises the difficulty of terminology. Philosophy, like every other science, must have its technical language. Under the system of a common programme, what technical language could or should be adopted? Some may hardly see any difficulty in such a question; they will reply: Let both classes of candidates be bound to know both the Catholic and non-Catholic terminology. This answer is simple, but totally unsuitable. The plan it suggests would be feasible if there were any such thing as a non-Catholic terminology. But, properly speaking, there is no such thing. It is not one; it is legion. This is not to be wondered at. Terminology is but “fossilised thought,” and, when it is the glory of every great thinker to think independently of his predecessors and contemporaries, it is only the natural result that “fossilisations” of this kind should abound. As a consequence, there are some hundred more or less independent and more or less antagonistic systems: there are the systems of Jevons, Venn, De Morgan, Sully, Sidgwick, Spencer, Bain, Mill, Hamilton, Mansel, Locke, Kant, &c. There is not one of these writers who has not contributed his quota to the confusion by introducing new terms, or, what is much worse, by attaching new

meanings to the old.* Catholic students could, of course, learn any one of these systems, and if they had to carry on a special polemic against the school to which it belongs, they would be bound to learn it. The jargon which passes current as a terminology borrows impartially from them all, and is consequently unintelligible even to adepts, except when they know the source from which it comes. Were so exorbitantly unreasonable a proposal to be made as that Catholic Professors should be bound to teach, or that Catholic students should be bound to learn, all these jarring systems, the former would be likely to show a disposition to resign the chairs, and the latter to quit the halls of Philosophy. The term of human life—not to say of philosophical study—is too brief to permit so large a portion of it as this gigantic undertaking would demand, to be expended upon “words, words, words.”†

If, then, it is out of the question to ask candidates to learn all the existing non-Catholic systems of terminology, which of them is it that they are to be bound to learn? When the advocates of common papers can agree as to the answer to that question, it may be admitted that the first difficulty is solved.

Without contending that the difficulty is irremovable, it is allowable to presume that anyone who makes light of it has never sufficiently realised its magnitude.

It is only when we contemplate the state of chaos to which non-Catholic terminology has been reduced, that we learn to estimate to the full the incomparable advantages of the scholastic terminology as a vehicle of Philosophical instruction. Fortunately, “there are very few terms employed by the leaders of the school which have not passed into the accepted philosophical and theological nomenclature of Europe.”‡ It was mainly owing to the absence of Catholic Universities in these countries during the past three centuries

* Illud imprimis notandum culpandumque est, quod fere quisque philosophus recens linguam propriam habeat, et iisdem verbis diversum diversi sensum attribuant, vel etiam ad idem significandum diversis vocabulis utantur; unde apud ipsos, quot homines, tot sententiæ, tot verba nova nihilque fixum neque definitum. Contra, unus est scholasticorum philosophorum sermo, una lingua pressa, definita, constans sibi, ita ut ab uno eorum omnes discas. Vallet, *Praelectiones Philosophicæ* I., p. 9.

† In no University of which I have any knowledge is this difficulty of terminology so pressing as in the Royal University. In every other there is at least a tacit understanding as to the text-books, or class of text-books, and consequently as to the terminology, to be used; in the Royal University there is no such understanding.

‡ W. J. Townsend—*Great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages*, p. 351.

that even a greater proportion of these terms did not become imbedded in the language. Even now it would be part of the mission of a Catholic University to promote and popularise their use; and no University which professes to recognise Catholic Philosophy can be dispensed from the duty of exercising an influence in that direction. It is not to be endured that they should be rejected bodily as obsolete or barbarous. With inconsiderable exceptions, they are neither more nor less so than the technical terms of most other sciences.*

II. *The Matter of the Questions.* A second and much more serious class of difficulties arises out of the Matter of the Papers. These may be reduced to two: (1) A common programme based on the principle under consideration is impossible; (2) it would be inadmissible, even if it were possible.

(1.) The state of the question is this:—A programme framed on this principle is bound to recognise equally Catholic and non-Catholic Philosophy. But non-Catholic Philosophy has no existence, except as an aggregate of conflicting systems. Such a programme, therefore, is bound to recognise impartially every School of Philosophy from the Catholic, inclusively, down to that—inclusively or exclusively we know not—of Universal Sceptics—if there be any such. It has no right to wound the susceptibilities of any. Every school counts for one, and no school for more than one. Phenomenism, Empiricism, Idealism, Materialism, not to descend lower, have each a right to a recognition as ample as any other. The problem, then, is to find a programme which shall be common to Catholic Philosophy and to *every species* of non-Catholic Philosophy, and which shall be common not merely in one or two subjects or sections of subjects, but *in all the subjects* of the course, without exception. I say *in all the subjects* of the course, without exception; for a programme which would be common in some subjects or sections of subjects, and not in others, is not the programme which is being discussed at present, but the programme which is to be discussed further on† under the heading—“The second plan—a programme in part common and in part special, &c.”

The state of the question being thus determined, the proposed problem becomes very easy of solution. To omit other

* Cfr. Harper—*Metaphysics of the Schools*, I., Introduction. Townsend, *ibid.*

† p. 43.

subjects, such as Theology and Ethics, in which the impossibility is equally evident, a common Programme in *Ontology* or *Anthropology* is manifestly impossible.

Can anything be more extravagant than to propose a course of Ontology and Anthropology for those who hold that there is no such thing, and that there cannot be any such thing, as either one or the other? But this is what is held at present, not merely by one or two, but by the greater number of the non-Catholic schools of these countries. At the risk of being tedious, I quote proofs in reference to a few of the leading Schools.

The School of Kant has many adherents in these countries. It is said to be particularly strong in Dublin, and whether this is so or not, works formally or substantially representing Kant's system are on the calendars of non-Catholic University colleges in Ireland, and in the hands of their students. Now "the object of the Critique of Kant is to show that in relation to all these [Rational Cosmology, Rational Psychology, and Rational Theology] the attainment of a system of speculative Philosophy is *impossible*."*

No one need be reminded of the daring attitude recently assumed, or of the alarming progress recently achieved, by the Experience (Positivist, Empiricist, or Sensist) School.† Mr. Mill claimed that it ruled half the Philosophical world. What is the position of this school towards Metaphysics? Ueberweg‡ gives the answer;—"Positivism contains *the denial of all Metaphysics*, and all search for first or final causes."

The Common Sense, or Scotch School, is the most orthodox of non-Catholic schools. Yet with Catholic writers it is a standing reproach to this school that it tends to annihilate all Metaphysics, and indeed all Ethics as well, by resolving both into Psychology and even into Experimental Psychology. Even Mr. M'Cosh, perhaps the soundest writer of the whole School, is fond of shutting out all the deeper Metaphysical problems upon the plea that they are "meaningless, futile, beyond the human faculties," &c.§

Every leader of Philosophic thought amongst non-Catholics belongs to one or other of these three schools; and all three hold—

*Mansel. *Prolegom. Log.* p. 277.

† Works of representatives of this school are on the calendar of every non-Catholic University college in Ireland.

‡ *History of Philosophy*, II., p. 344.

§ *Intuitions of the Human Mind*, *passim*.

and *by their principles are compelled to hold*—that a Science of Ontology or of Rational Psychology is impossible.

The argument, therefore, showing the futility of any attempt to lay down a programme for non-Catholic students in these subjects is as complete as it is simple. Yet if more were needed towards completing it, it would be forthcoming. I shall refer but to a single point.

A common paper which is not a common paper is surely an extreme anomaly. Now, in my opinion, hardly any paper hitherto set in Metaphysics was a *bona fide* common paper. A paper of questions is for the intellect, not for the eye; consequently, a paper will be common or not, according as it is understood *in the same sense* or not. Now what appears to me is that many questions in those subjects were so ambiguously worded that any one of several totally different senses could be—and often with almost equal plausibility—extracted from them. It would take too long to attempt a detailed proof of this statement; but a very striking illustration of the extreme difficulty of interpreting one of these papers has occurred within the past week.

A distinguished member of the Senate of the Royal University has recently published a most able and interesting pamphlet on “The Study of Mental Philosophy by Catholic Students in the Royal University”—a pamphlet which is sure to contribute most notably to the realisation of the zealous author’s aim of imparting a vigorous impetus to the cultivation of the Science of Philosophy, especially on its polemical side.* Towards the end of the pamphlet the learned author comments upon the Honour Paper in Metaphysics set at the B.A. examination last September—a paper which at the time attracted a great deal of very unfavourable attention. Dr. Kavanagh, however, though confessing that “at first glance it seemed a bit puzzling,” considers that “apart from phraseology and form it was an excellent paper,” and to prove this he re-sets† the leading questions of the paper. The

* I have indicated elsewhere that, according to my interpretation of the Encyclical, polemics proper belongs to “the Academies” and not to the class-room. I see no reason to think that Dr. Kavanagh dissents from this interpretation.

† It is strange that Dr. Kavanagh should subsequently speak of “the paper in this form,” implying that his paper is but the original paper in a different form. This, of course, I would not at all admit. Though it is a very small matter, I wish to add that Dr. Kavanagh has fallen into a slight mistake in stating that I approved of the paper as re-set by him. He has not adverted to the circumstance that question 5, and part of question 2, were not in the copy sent to me. I would have objected to both additions.

original paper consisted of 12 questions, counting alternatives; of these Dr. Kavanagh retains but 4 unaltered. "Omitting the conundrum with which the paper opens, and which should never have appeared there," he then interprets "the leading questions" of the remainder of the paper by "*slightly altering them in form and phraseology*." The interpretation is presented in 9 distinct questions, arranged under the first five numbers of his paper. Now I am familiar *usque ad nauseam* with the original paper, and with the context of the questions in the works from which they were copied, and it is my full conviction that not one of the 9 questions propounded by Dr. Kavanagh interprets accurately even the substance of the original, and that at least five of them are not interpretations of it, but pure additions to it. Whether I am right or wrong in this conviction is immaterial; the bare existence of so radical a difference of opinion as to the meaning of the paper so long a time after it was set, constitutes a very heavy presumption that it contained more than one "conundrum," and that the interpretations put upon it by Catholic candidates necessarily less familiar with current non-Catholic terminology, and working under the excitement of keen competition, must have been refreshing in their variety.*

What claims has such a paper—even omitting the circumstance that it allowed alternatives in 4 cases out of 9—to be regarded as a common paper? Assuredly none. Candidates were nominally answering the same questions, but were really answering quite different ones. Would it not be a far better and a far more logical procedure to have two separate papers set containing questions drawn in unmistakably clear language, and to have candidates compelled to write in every instance to the question set and to no other?

(2). The plan of a common Programme as above would be inadmissible even if it were possible.

A common Programme would require Catholic students to study non-Catholic Philosophy as closely as they study their own, for as many questions are likely to fall on it; nay, hitherto, under a common programme, far more questions have fallen on it. Further, they must study it not merely, as under the Catholic system, on the points on which it has contact

*Dr. Kavanagh seems to look upon the Pass paper in Metaphysics as a model one. Unfortunately, I am compelled to regard it as much nearer to the reverse. Beyond misrepresenting two Catholic questions, I cannot see what advance it shows upon an average London University paper, or an average paper of the late Queen's University.

with Catholic Philosophy, but on all points—at least of any prominence—quite irrespectively of such contact. There is no undertaking that questions shall be limited to points of controversy, and, as a matter of fact, controversial questions have hitherto been rare.* Now, as has been frequently pointed out, non-Catholic Philosophy, being interpreted, means the Philosophy of the Common Sense School, the Philosophy of Empiricists, of Idealists, of Phenomenists, &c. The proposal, then, is logically reduced to this: Catholic students should study the Philosophy of the Common Sense School, the Philosophy of Empiricists, of Phenomenists, of Idealists, &c., as closely in the aggregate as they do their own; and should study them not only on points of controversy, but on all other points of any importance.

What is to be thought of such a plan? No matter how expounded, it seems to me to be better adapted to the purpose of making sciolists or sceptics † than to that of forming Philosophers; it seems also to be totally opposed to all the traditions of Catholic schools; to the dictates of common sense, to the methods adopted in teaching all the other sciences, and to the leading objects of the Encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*. Omitting to develop any of the other arguments suggested, I shall confine myself to a consideration of the last.

* It is most important that this circumstance should be carefully kept in view. To give an idea of the class of questions belonging to non-Catholic Philosophy, upon which under a common programme Catholic professors are expected to prepare their students, I give a few specimens from the papers set at the recent examinations in Metaphysics. There are obvious reasons why it should be held to be fair to select these papers. Questions 1 and 2 are from the Honour Paper, questions 3 and 4 from the Pass:—

1. State distinctly the law of Contiguous Association, and trace its operation (a) in the acquiring of musical airs, (b) in the acquiring of a foreign language.

2. What do you understand by concentration of mind? Explain fully in what way it aids (a) acquisition; (b) discovery. Is anything known or surmised as to its physiological concomitants?

3. Exemplify and explain exalted acuteness of sense, such as is found among Indians, sailors, &c.

4. Account for these phenomena:—

(a) "After we look for a time at a moving object, stationary objects begin to move."

(b) "A certain admixture of pain intensifies pleasure."

It would be very easy to extend this list.

† Is there not a distinct reference to the dangers of such a method of study in the following passage from the Encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*:—"A multitudine sententiarum [etiam de iis rebus quae sunt in humanis cognitionibus praecipuae] ad haesitationes dubitationesque persaepe ventum est: a dubitationibus vero in errorem quam facile mentes hominum delabantur nemo est qui non videat." Is there not also a melancholy illustration of its tendencies in the alarming spread of scepticism amongst educated non-Catholics?

Two forms of this plan might be conceived: one which would propose that the programme should cover the whole ground of Catholic and of non-Catholic Philosophy so completely as to include all questions, whether leading questions or not; the other, which would propose that the programme should be strictly limited to *leading questions*.

A common programme which would propose to embrace all questions, great and small, of Catholic and of non-Catholic Philosophy, need not be seriously discussed. It would lead to such results as the following:—(1.) That both classes of students would be enormously overweighted; (2) that neither class would learn anything rightly, “many-sidedness” or “either-sidedness” of view leading, in the case of average students, to “neither-sidedness.” (3) That the use of a whole set of most objectionable non-Catholic text-books to represent the different schools would be rendered indispensably necessary.

The second form of this plan—which would propose to limit the common programme to leading questions, whether of Catholic or of non-Catholic Philosophy—would also be inadmissible even if it were possible.

(1.) Though this form would have the advantage over the preceding one of not requiring Catholic students to possess a thorough or minute knowledge of non-Catholic Philosophy, it would have the disadvantage, as compared with it, of not requiring them to possess a thorough or minute knowledge of their own; * it would not, therefore, provide even for the substantial fulfilment of the instructions of the Encyclical, “ut sapientiae rivos purissimos . . . studiosae juventuti *large copioseque* universi praebeatis.” Did his Holiness ever recommend us to teach our students non-Catholic Philosophy *large copioseque*? † How would he be likely to view a proposal to teach Catholic Philosophy with neither more nor less painstaking or thoroughness than non-Catholic?

(2.) If it is agreed that a Catholic text-book is necessary even though none but leading Catholic questions be matter for examination, how can it be disputed that a non-Catholic text-book is necessary even though none but leading non-

* I have shown elsewhere that unless Catholic students are content to surrender all hope of successful competition in the Royal University, it is idle to expect them to give any serious study during their University career to any course of Philosophy other than that required for the University examinations.

† I assume, of course, that non-Catholic Philosophy would be refuted, so far as it requires refutation.

Catholic questions be matter for examination? So long *at least*, as there is no Catholic text-book in the language dealing with those questions, a non-Catholic text-book is neither more nor less necessary than a Catholic. And even though such a text-book were not strictly necessary, yet students, as every teacher knows, would believe that it was; and, so believing, would insist on examining those questions and all their surroundings from the non-Catholic point of view, not knowing from what side the Examiners might approach them, and not being willing to leave anything to chance.

(3.) How is the line to be drawn between leading questions and less important ones? Either the discrimination of such questions would be left, as hitherto, to the judgment of the Examiners, or a syllabus of leading questions determined *in infima specie* would be drawn up. In the former hypothesis—not to allude to the unfair and immense advantages which pupils of the Examiners would thus necessarily have over all others—the use of non-Catholic text-books would be absolutely unavoidable, inasmuch as students could not be expected to believe that the judgment of their Professor on such subjects would be sure to coincide with that of the Examiners: in the latter hypothesis, the questions of the syllabus might in many instances not be really leading questions at all, as non-Catholics should have as much voice in their selection as Catholics, and, as we have seen, their estimates of the importance of questions very often differ diametrically.

(4.) But I have reserved for the last place the statement of the objection which seems to me most decisive against this form of a common programme. The whole object of the attempt to secure a common programme is to secure common questions. Now it appears to me that this object could never be attained. I wish to state most distinctly that, in my opinion, the mere circumstance that two candidates while addressing themselves to the same question take exactly contradictory positions, and defend them to the best of their ability, constitutes no serious difficulty in the way of estimating the relative merits of their answers: the whole system of scholastic debate is based upon an assumption of the fairness of such a test. But there is no test as to the relative merits of the answers when students refuse to address themselves to the same question by refusing to accept the *status quæstionis*. Just as the 47th Proposition of Euclid's First Book presupposes the preceding 46, so in Catholic Philosophy any given thesis presupposes all the theses which go before it. A disputant who refuses to

presuppose these theses places himself *extra quæstionem*, and addresses himself, not to the question set, but to one which is but a necessary preliminary to it.

Suppose, then, the question of the Immortality of the Soul to be set. A disciple of Professor Bain might answer it thus : "Nothing is to be affirmed as true except upon the warrant of experience."* "But there is no warrant of experience for affirming that the Soul is Immortal. Therefore the Immortality of the Soul is not to be affirmed as true." If such a candidate, assuming the truth of the *Minor* as evident, expended all his erudition in proving the *Major*, would he get any credit for his answer ? If he would not, has he not reason to complain that the question set should demand of him the supposition that the fundamental principle of his whole system is false ? If he would, how can it be maintained that two students are answering a common question when the fact is that one is dealing with a question in Criteriology (Applied Logic), and the other with a question in Anthropology ?

But this is not the only demand which must be made before the question of the Immortality of the Soul can be intelligently discussed. It must also be presupposed that the Soul exists, that it is a substance, that it is immaterial and spiritual, that consequently Materialism and Phenomenism are radically false. Will the advocates of these systems be willing to accept such suppositions even *argumentationis gratia* ? There is nothing whatsoever to show that they will, nor would it be very reasonable to expect that they would. Their ordinary method of attacking such theses is indirect. Thus Professor Bain ridicules the question of the presence of the "Mind" in the whole body upon the ground that "Mind" is not a substance ; he attacks the Liberty of the Will upon the ground that there is no Will, &c. Would such methods of dealing with a question be permitted in answering an examination paper ? If they would, there is an end not only of common questions, and of logical procedure, but also of all fair play. A disciple of Professor Bain need but prepare a set of arguments to show that the Soul is not a substance, and this single set will avail him indifferently against all the leading theses of Anthropology which presuppose its substantiality. Thus, such a candidate need but prepare a single thesis, while his Catholic competitor may have had to prepare a very considerable number of very difficult ones.

I would sum up this argument thus : there can never be common questions so long as candidates will not agree as to the state of a given question proposed for discussion ; and candidates cannot possibly agree as to the state of a given question so long as they do not agree even as to the validity of the different *media* of cognition. Now it is precisely upon the question of the validity of the different *media* of cognition that the more prominent non-Catholic schools separate from the Catholic. This fact seems to me to be the fundamental explanation of the impossibility of common questions.

From whatever aspect, therefore, we regard it, or in whatever form it is proposed, a common programme based upon the principle of recognising equally Catholic and non-Catholic Philosophy, must, in my opinion, be pronounced to be inadmissible and impossible.

FIRST PLAN.

(Third Form. A common Programme framed on a different principle.)

So far we have been considering the possibility of a common programme which would recognise equally Catholic and non-Catholic Philosophy. But the question might be raised :—Could a common programme be devised which would recognise neither Catholic nor non-Catholic Philosophy ? Undoubtedly : such a programme was (and perhaps still is) in use in some of the German Universities * in which the interests of Catholic and of non-Catholic students had to be consulted for. The common programme consisted of the Philosophical works of Aristotle.

I leave it to others to judge of the merits of this plan. It has serious shortcomings ; but if a common programme be held to be necessary, this probably would be less objectionable and more workable than any other.

SECOND PLAN.

**A programme in part common and in part special ;
a paper in part common, and in part special ;
and common prizes.**

An examination paper under this section would consist of a Catholic, a non-Catholic, and a neutral section.

* As, for example, in Munich.

The main obstacle to the working of this plan is the difficulty of finding a basis for the questions in the neutral section. Three methods might be suggested for overcoming it :—

(A.) That the questions in the neutral section should be based on select parts of Aristotle's Philosophical works.

(B.) That the questions should be based on a special syllabus containing all the leading and important questions special to Catholic or special to non-Catholic Philosophy.

(C.) That the questions should be based on those portions of Philosophy which are common to Catholic and non-Catholic schools.

With respect to method (A) I have nothing to add to what I have said above.*

The second method (B) seems to me to be objectionable and unworkable, substantially for reasons already given.†

The third method, therefore, alone remains for consideration, and very few lines will suffice upon it.

How much is really common to Catholic and to *every species* of non-Catholic Philosophy?

To a certain extent, the following are common :—(1.) The purely formal processes of Deductive Logic ; (2) Psychical Phenomena—as sensation, imagination, emotion, volition, &c.; (3) History of Philosophy. Beyond this there is, in my opinion, little or nothing admitted in common.‡

Considering that these *data* are rather the preamble to Philosophy than a part proper of the science, and considering the difficulties likely to arise from the difference of terminology, of text-books, of methods, and, above all, of the *Criteria of Truth accepted as valid*, would there be any hope that this common ground would suffice as the basis for the questions in the common or neutral section of the paper? In my opinion there would not.

THIRD PLAN.

(Separate programmes, separate papers, and common prizes.)

This plan seems to me to be beyond comparison, more logical, more useful, and more workable than any of the preceding.

* p. 43.

† p. 40-43.

‡ Some might hold that there are a few things in common in Ethics, such as Moral Judgments. How far this may be true it is unnecessary to inquire; for, as already pointed out, a Science of Ethics is inconceivable unless we are allowed to postulate (as proved elsewhere) the Liberty of the Will, the Existence of God, the existence of Final Causes, &c.

As the Programme would be by hypothesis thoroughly Catholic, and as it would be drawn strictly on the lines of the Encyclical so often referred to, it would, of course, fulfil in the most perfect degree all the objects which that historic document seeks to attain. In particular, modern questions could be made subjects of the examinations to any extent duly proportioned to the time, and strength, and standing of the student, and to the importance of the questions themselves, as estimated by Catholic standards. Under such an arrangement, they could be submitted to methodical exposition and discussion in the schools, and students would get an opportunity of acquiring a really solid and useful knowledge of them.

There is a practical difficulty in the way of this plan which might, at first sight, seem to be serious, but which is not really such. It is this: How are the answers of candidates presenting the Catholic Programme to be compared with the answers of candidates presenting the non-Catholic? This difficulty is not new; it is one which has been encountered and overcome in various other departments of the University.

To take a few instances: 1. At all the examinations in the Royal University, from the Matriculation inclusively to the M.A. inclusively, the answers of candidates presenting respectively French, German, Italian, Spanish, Celtic, Sanscrit, Hebrew, and Arabic have to be compared (Cal. p. 31, 35, 39, 46, 57). 2. At the B.A. and M.A. Honour Examinations the answers of candidates presenting respectively Ethics, Civil and Constitutional History, Political Economy, and Civil Jurisprudence, have to be compared (Cal. p. 46 and 57). Some of the subjects mentioned in both these instances are surely as remote from each other as the Catholic and non-Catholic courses of Philosophy could possibly be.

But it may be said that in all these cases the alternative offered to candidates is not thoroughgoing; that if they are allowed an alternative in one subject of the course, they are allowed no alternative in the remaining subjects. This is true, though it is a distinction not in principle but in detail. We have, however, numerous instances of thoroughgoing alternative courses. Thus, for the degree of B.A., and for the degree of M.A., the candidate has an option as amongst *seven courses* (Cal. p. 47 and 57), not necessarily possessing a single subject in common, and, in *five* instances out of the *seven*, not possibly possessing a single subject in common. Thus the answers of a candidate presenting Latin and Greek Languages and Literature, have to be compared with the answers

of candidates presenting respectively (1) English, French, and German ; or (2) Logic, Metaphysics, and History of Philosophy ; or (3) Mathematics, and Mathematical Physics ; or (4) Biology, Geology, &c. And what it is vital to observe is, that it is precisely upon a comparison of these different courses, in the case of the examination for the Degree of B.A., that the Honours and Exhibitions of the University have to be decided. (Cal. p. 47.)

FOURTH PLAN.

(Separate programmes, separate papers, and separate prizes).

This plan would seem to differ from the preceding, rather in theory than in practice. Thus, at the B.A. Degree Examination last year, six courses were presented. To each of four of the courses, two exhibitions were distributed ; and to each of the remaining two, one.

It has, however, been shown above, that this plan is by no means necessary. There is a special difficulty about the Studentship, but it is one for which various satisfactory solutions could be devised.

I now submit this paper to the judgment of those for whom it was written. I regret that the course of the argument has rendered an expression of my individual opinion so often unavoidable. I do not claim to possess any very special knowledge of the subjects discussed, but I do claim to have been most painstaking in the effort to secure the greatest possible accuracy and fairness of statement throughout.

APPENDIX.

As the following papers have been so frequently referred to in the foregoing pages, it is only fair that I should give my readers an opportunity of examining them for themselves.

Royal University.

B.A. Degree Examinations.

HONOUR EXAMINATION, 1883.

METAPHYSICS.

1. Explain and illustrate the distinction between Afferent and Efferent Nerves. Define Instinct and Reflex action.

2. It has been maintained that the enumeration of five senses is incomplete. Criticise this theory and the grounds on which it has been advanced.

3. How do we determine the distinction between Reality and Appearance in the Material World?

4. Explain and illustrate the following remarks:—

(a.) “After we have brought our thoughts to run currently along a train of ideas they cannot always run back again the contrary way, although in the same track.”

(b.) “By continual use the middle links (of our trains of thought) frequently drop out or pass so swiftly as not to touch the notice.”

5. What is meant by the Law of Relativity as applied to human consciousness?

6. “Does it not rather appear a flat self-contradiction to maintain that I am not immediately conscious of myself, but only of my sensations or volitions? Who then is the *I* that is conscious, and how can I be conscious of such states as *mine*?”

7. Define Life. Define some of the definitions different from your own, which have been given on this subject.

8. State your notion of Personality. Distinguish between the concepts, Human Personality and Human Nature.

9. State briefly Kant's view as to the origin of our notion of Space. Criticise his theory.

Or, Discuss the statement:—"It is the great law of the will that we are moved *to* pleasure and *from* pain." If there are any important exceptions to this, state and explain them.

HONOUR EXAMINATION, 1883.

ETHICS.

1. Define accurately the terms: Free Act, Voluntary Act, Appetite, Desire, Custom, Habit.

2. Analyse the concept of Moral Obligation. State how far it is identical with, and in what it differs from, the concepts of Moral Law and Moral Responsibility, respectively.

3. What do you hold to be the ultimate ground of distinction between morally good and morally evil actions? State briefly the arguments by which you would prove your view. Explain and refute any well-known theory opposed to your own.

4. Can the intuitional theory of conscience be reconciled with the actual diversity of opinion on morality?

5. Explain: "Taste is its own evidence, but conscience does not repose in itself, but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions."

6. "A scientific morality would imply not only a psychology but also a sociology."

7. Account for the child's pleasure in *ex. gr.* spinning a cock-chaffer.

8. What is meant by Altruism? Comment upon modern expressions of this doctrine. Compare with those the views of Shaftsbury and Hume.

9. Distinguish between the various uses of the term *justice*. Define *justice* as a virtue.

10. How far do you hold duelling to be contrary to the natural law of morals? Prove your answer.

PASS EXAMINATION, 1884.

METAPHYSICS.

1. Exemplify and explain exalted acuteness of sense, such as is found among Indians, sailors, &c.

2. State what is called the law of Inseparable Association, and mention some applications of it.

3. Describe clearly and distinctly how concepts are formed and preserved.

4. Give an analysis of the mental act called Judgment, stating fully all the parts of this process of mind.

5. State and comment on some of the leading classifications that have been made of the fundamental facts of mind.

6. Account for these phenomena :—

(a.) “After we look for a time at a moving object, stationary objects seem to move.”

(b.) “A certain admixture of pain intensifies pleasure.”

7. What is meant by the *simplicity* of the human mind? By what arguments would you show that it possesses this attribute?

8. What do you understand to be the proper subject matter of metaphysics? How far do you consider metaphysics to be a science? Prove your answer.

9. Analyse the notion of extension. Distinguish between this notion and that of space.

10. State briefly, with comments, the arguments adduced to prove that mind possesses substantial existence apart from matter.

HONOUR EXAMINATION, 1884.

METAPHYSICS.

1. Comment upon *two* of these passages :—

(a.) “All introspection is retrospection.”

(b.) “In specifying all the conditions of a class of mental operations, we must refer not only to psychical but to physical circumstances.”

(c.) “The older psychology of Locke and his followers overlooked the effects of individual ‘nature.’ Modern writers are, perhaps, more liable to overlook the effects of ‘nurture.’”

2. Discuss the statement—“Resistance to the locomotive energy is the only mode of consciousness, which directly tells us of the existence of an external world; and the attributes which are made known to us in that relation are the only ones which are directly given as constituting a material reality.”

3. Explain and illustrate the various meanings of the word *external* as applied to sensible objects; or

State briefly the theory expressed in the following :—*Corpus dicitur compositum ex materia et forma.*

Explain with suitable comment :—“*Reproduction* may be said to involve the co-operation, in different proportions, or with different

degrees of distinctness, of two elements, a link of similarity or identity, and a link of contiguity;" or

Explain the nature of (a) Obstructive Association ; (b) Implicit Reasoning.

5. State distinctly the law of Contiguous Association, and trace its operation (a) in the acquiring of musical airs ; (b) in the acquiring of a foreign language.

6. Distinguish between the optical and muscular elements in the sensation of sight. Explain how, by their combination, the eye enables us to obtain a knowledge of *form*, *extension*, and co-existence in space. Could we obtain this knowledge by the optical element only ?

7. What do you understand by the *organic sense* ? What proof would you give that it is entitled to rank among the senses properly so called ?

8. What do you understand by concentration of mind ? Explain fully in what way it aids (a) acquisition ; (b) discovery. Is anything known or surmised as to its physiological concomitants ? or

Are Space and Time substances, or attributes, or relations, or forms ? Define the terms used in this question.

9. Is consciousness co-extensive with the phenomena of mind ?

NOTE.

[As the foregoing paper seems still to engage public attention, some readers may be glad to learn that Q. 1 (a), (b), and (c) ; Q. 4, 1st alternative ; and 2nd alternative (a) and (b)—to say nothing of any others—are to be found *verbatim* at the following pages respectively of Mr. Sully's *Outlines of Psychology* :—p. 5, 31, 69, 268, 275, 416. Of these facts I was not aware in November last when I wrote an article in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* criticising this paper, mainly from the standpoint of fair play. As a consequence, my argument was less complete than it might otherwise have been. The book had been published but a few months previously : the preface is dated February, 1884.

Anyone who will take the trouble to consult the pages referred to will be in a position to judge how far it is to the purpose to inquire whether those questions were "unduly difficult," or at all difficult, to non-Catholic candidates, as also how far it is in accordance with facts to state that they "deal not with matters of detail, but with great leading questions in Mental Philosophy." The cost of this work (which, though embracing more than 700 pages, the author "somewhat strangely calls" *Outlines*), as also of one or two of the works of Professor Bain—considering the advantageous terms at which students can usually purchase them—will not be prohibitory even to such non-Catholic

students as do not enjoy the free use of an ample library maintained for their benefit at the expense of the State. "The standard of knowledge" which those works would represent should not, in my opinion, be accounted too high for a student seeking an Honours degree, nor would it be too hard to ask non-Catholic students "to prepare for their examination" by studying "the mass of Philosophical and Psychological literature" which they contain, especially if those students were provided, again at the expense of the State, with the best of all guidance in their studies. At all events it seems to me to be beyond question that two or three of the works of Messrs. Bain and Sully alone would be worth more than a whole library of scholastic works, whether mediæval or modern, to candidates preparing for a paper in *Metaphysics*, such as the above: and this circumstance is the more extraordinary for the reason that Mr. Sully protests that his work contains *no Metaphysics* (that he can avoid), and that Professor Bain never claimed that *his* contained any, or even that he himself believed in the possibility of any.

That the Holy Father Leo XIII. has a high esteem for "Scholastic Philosophy" even "as it existed in the days of St. Thomas," everyone must have heard before this; that he has any very keen appreciation of the value of the "Philosophical and Psychological literature" of such writers as Messrs. Bain and Sully no one yet has heard, and no one, it may be presumed, is likely ever to hear. It was not, therefore, without some bewilderment that some of us saw it recently stated by one who holds a high and honoured position amongst us, and to whom we thought we might have looked for juster views, as also for language occasionally less harsh and unfair in reference to our Catholic Philosophical schools, that "the cry raised against the Honours paper in *Metaphysics* is the most conclusive evidence of the necessity of the *development of Philosophical studies in Ireland which the Holy Father so earnestly recommends*," as also that "unless we are satisfied to remain at a contemptible level of Philosophic attainment," we must cease "to quarrel with an attempt to *force us up* to a becoming standard of competency"—meaning, thereby, the standard at which we could obtain "the Degree of B.A. with *Honours*," by unfolding the *Ethical* mysteries involved in "the spinning of cockchafers."

HONOUR EXAMINATION, 1884.

ETHICS.

1. State and examine various definitions of *bonum*, *malum*, *honestum*, *utile*, *pulchrum*.
2. Explain and illustrate the ethical conception of an end. How may these ends be classified?

3. How far is it true, and why, that—

(a.) "Virtue alone is happiness below."

(b.) "A man may be the happier by taking for his end that which is not the ultimate end."

4. Are there any deliberate actions which are neither morally good nor morally bad? State the arguments on which your view is founded, and criticise the arguments by which the view opposite to your own has been maintained.

5. What is meant by being *obliged* to do a thing? "Why am I obliged to keep my word?"

6. Briefly comment on *two* of the following passages:—

(a.) "As in the world without, so in the world within us, the light by guiding us proves that it is its office to guide us."

(b.) "An abstract question in morality is distinct from a question respecting the constitution of man's moral nature."

(c.) "There is no peculiar contrariety between self-love and benevolence; no greater competition between these than between any other particular affections and self-love."

7. What is meant by the sanction of a law? Is a sanction provided for the moral law? If so, explain its nature.

8. Sketch briefly the principles and methods of Egoistic Hedonism, and criticise the main arguments that have been adduced to support it.

9. Explain and discuss:—"Indeed from a practical point of view Egoism and Utilitarianism may fairly be regarded as extremes between which the common-sense morality is a kind of *media via*."



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